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Chapter 1
Introduction
Perhaps the most well-known result of the economic research on group per-
formance is that the free-rider problem arises when a common output is fully
shared by all group members, while the cost of contribution is solely borne
by each contributor himself. Indeed, the free-rider problem usually occurs
in the team production environment and can also be observed in the private
provision of public goods by groups (see. e.g. Olson (1965), Hardin (1968),
Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). In particular, economic theory predicts that
the free-rider problem will reduce individual contributions, leading to ine¢ -
cient production outcome and lower level of social welfare. While mutual
monitoring, peer pressure, and punishment may help to discourage free-
riding behavior, incentive-compatible reward schemes are often considered
as the most powerful instrument against free-riding and moral hazard (see
e.g. Groves (1973), Holmström (1982), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Prender-
gast (1999)). Unfortunately, the economically e¢ cient behavior is not always
contractible. Nevertheless, evidences for altruistic and cooperative behavior
in teams and voluntary contribution in public goods are often reported both
in the lab and in the eld.1
In this thesis, the impact of inequity aversion and overcondence on group
performance is studied. The following three chapters theoretically investigate
how other-regarding preferences and overly optimistic self-perception a¤ect
1An overwiew of the related literature will be presented at the beginning of each chapter.
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individualscontribution to a common output that is equally shared by all
group members. The studies presented here concentrate on two main topics:
First, we investigate the private provision of public goods when agents are
motivated by fairness concerns in terms of inequity aversion. Second, we
study the consequences of overly optimistic self-perception for the allocation
of tasks and the incentives for cooperation in teams.
All chapters are common regarding three features: First, they all focus
on situations in which economically e¢ cient e¤ort choices and contribution
levels are not contracted such that incentives for free-riding behavior may
exist. Second, both in the public goods and in the team production settings
the group outcome is always fully and equally shared by all group members.
Finally, both inequity aversion and overcondence can help to mitigate the
negative impact of the free-rider problem leading to more e¢ cient outcomes,
even without having to implement the optimal incentive contracts.
In the following, we will briey present the main research questions and
the key results of each chapter. This thesis can be divided into two parts. In
the rst part (chapter 2), we investigate the e¤ects of inequality in wealth
on the incentives to contribute to a public good when agents are inequity
averse and di¤er in their abilities. The research questions we address in this
chapter include: How does (un)equal distribution of wealth a¤ect agents
contribution to a public good when they also care for fairness? And what
is the optimal wealth distribution that maximizes the social welfare? The
results of our formal analysis show that it is worthwhile to introduce ex-ante
inequality in wealth when agents of di¤erent abilities are inequity averse.
The reason is that inequality in favor of a more able agent can motivate this
agent to exert higher e¤orts and helps the group to coordinate on equilibria
with higher contributions and less free-riding. In particular, the stronger the
agentsinequity aversion, the greater is also this incentive e¤ect of inequality
and the larger should be the di¤erence in initial wealth. In contrast, treating
heterogenous agents equally may lead to a reduction of public good provision
below levels generated by purely selsh agents.
In the second part (chapters 3 and 4), we analyze the e¤ects of biased
self-perception in terms of overcondence on team performance. In chapter
2
3, we study the consequences of manager overcondence for organizational
performance in a setting in which the manager chooses the allocation of two
tasks with di¤erent impact. The research questions we study include: What
are the e¤ects of manager overcondence on the task allocation in rms? Is
managersbiased self-perception generally harmful or benecial for rm per-
formance? And can manager overcondence persist in an organization? In
this regard, we show that overcondent managers may exhibit responsibility
hoarding behavior and carry out the critical task that has greater impact
on rm outcome more often themselves than fully rational managers would.
Hence, manager overcondence may counteract shirking, causing managers to
take up more responsibility and reducing ine¢ cient job distributions. While
responsibility hoarding is individually suboptimal for the overcondent man-
ager, it can raise the rm output and the total welfare of all involved parties
compared to the case with a fully rational manager, when the overcondent
managers true ability is su¢ ciently high relative to his self-perception bias.
Hence, our results imply that rms will not generally avoid overcondent and
responsibility hoarding managers, but may even prefer them to fully rational
ones. Moreover, an overcondent managers biased self-perception and his
responsibility hoarding behavior can persist in an organization, as long as
the manager can rationalize his biased overestimation of the own ability by
underestimating the ability of the agent.
Chapter 4 investigates the e¤ect of agent overcondence on the incen-
tives for helping and cooperation in teams. The research questions we focus
on include: Are managers more likely to help fully rational or overcon-
dent agents? And how does agentsbiased self-perception a¤ect the team
performance? In a setting with complementary production technology, we
show that overcondent agents generally tend to exert higher e¤ort to the
team production, even though it is individually suboptimal as they su¤er
from higher e¤ort costs. However, managers may provide more helping to
overcondent agents than to fully rational ones due to the synergy of ef-
forts. Interestingly, both individual utility and total welfare of all involved
parties can be higher when agents are moderately overcondent. However,
the positive e¤ect of agent overcondence crucially depends on the man-
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agers awareness of the agents biased self-perception. In particular, our re-
sults imply that rms should not generally avoid hiring overcondent agents.
But, to exploit the benets from the employment of overcondent agents,
well-founded knowledge on the agentsself-perception bias is necessary. Fi-
nally, agent overcondence and higher level of cooperation among the team
members can be sustained in an organization, when the stochastic feedback
structure obscures feedback.
We now discuss the content of the following chapters in more detail.
The rst part of chapter 2 presents the formal model and the results of the
equilibrium analysis. We rst introduce a simple setting with two agents who
are inequity averse as formalized in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Both agents
may di¤er in their abilities and decide simultaneously on their contributions
to a public good which is increasing in each agents contribution. As both
agents may have di¤erent abilities, the marginal e¤ect of their contributions
may be di¤erent. For simplicity, we assume that both agents benet to
the same extent from the public good. As the more able agent provides
higher inputs and, in turn, bears higher costs, equality in initial wealth may
then lead to inequity.2 Our equilibrium analysis shows that there are two
possible types of equilibrium due to the form of the agentsutility functions.
While one agent attains a higher utility than the other one in an inequitable
equilibrium, both agents are equally well o¤ in an equitable equilibrium. In
particular, the initial wealth di¤erential is crucial to determine how inequity
averse agents choose their e¤ort, and thus, which type of equilibrium will
eventually be established, i.e. for high levels of inequality in initial wealth
there is a unique inequitable equilibrium, and for intermediate values of initial
wealth di¤erential equitable equilibria exist. In this regard, we also show that
there are always multiple equitable equilibria. The reason is that inequity
averse agents have some interest to adapt their own e¤ort according to their
group members e¤ort in order to avoid the disutility from inequity. This
leads to a coordination problem as the reaction functions are upward sloping.
2In the following, we use the term inequality describing inequality in initial wealth,
and the term inequity describing inequality in wealth after agents have contributed and
received their benets from the public good.
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Moreover, the set of equitable equilibria is the larger, the higher the agents
degree of inequity aversion: The more the agents care for equity, the larger
is their willingness to adapt their e¤orts to reduce inequity which may either
be triggered by inequality in initial wealth or the group members e¤ort level.
Likewise, the stronger the agentsaversion against inequity, the larger may
be the maximal initial wealth inequality the agents are willing to o¤set by
adapting their contributions ending up in an equitable equilibrium.
Based on the results of the rst part of this chapter, we compare the con-
tribution level of inequity averse agents and that of purely selsh agents and
then examine possible e¤ects of redistribution policy. In this context, our re-
sults indicate that for intermediate levels of initial wealth inequality, inequity
aversion indeed helps to reduce the free-rider problem as both agents exert
higher e¤orts relative to the levels chosen by purely selsh agents maximizing
their material payo¤s. However, for larger initial wealth di¤erential, inequity
aversion leads to an asymmetric reaction as the favored agent chooses a
higher e¤ort than the level maximizing her material payo¤ and the disad-
vantaged contributes less than would be optimal from a payo¤ maximizing
perspective. Regarding the e¤ects of redistribution policy, we rst consider
the agentsindividual preferences for redistribution of a given amount of to-
tal initial wealth. We show that a less able agent can be better o¤ ex-post by
transferring parts of her initial wealth to her more able colleague when both
agents are inequity averse. Second, from the perspective of a social planner
who is either egalitarian or utilitarian it can be optimal to give the agents
di¤erent initial wealth exactly because agents are inequity averse, where the
more productive agent is provided with a higher amount of initial wealth.
Most strikingly, the stronger the agentsinequity aversion, the larger should
be the di¤erence in initial wealth. The basic mechanism is the following:
If agents are purely selsh and maximize their own payo¤, more productive
agents will provide more e¤ort as their marginal return is higher. As all
agents receive the same share of the public good, the more productive agent
gets a smaller total payo¤ than the less able if both agents are endowed with
the same initial wealth. In particular, the less able agent receives a higher
payo¤ than the more able by free-riding. Inequity averse agents with high
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ability dislike this, and consequently, reduce their e¤ort, although it is op-
timal for them to exert higher e¤ort than the less able. However, if agents
receive di¤erent initial wealth they might choose high level of contributions to
the public good. The reason is that under certain conditions inequity averse
agents coordinate on an equitable equilibrium with high contribution when
the distribution of initial wealth is aligned to the di¤erence in their abilities.
In these equilibria, both agents have an incentive to match their colleagues
contribution and, in turn, the free-rider problem can be substantially reduced
when the agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Therefore,
a less able agent may benet when her high ability colleagues income is in-
creased because, in turn, this colleague is willing to contribute more. Finally,
we demonstrate that under the optimal distribution of wealth, total contri-
butions are independent of the group composition, i.e. homogeneous and
heterogeneous groups provide the same amount of public good and attain
the identical levels of social welfare.
In chapter 3, the e¤ects of manager overcondence on task allocation and
rm performance are being investigated. In the rst part of this chapter, we
introduce a joint production setting, in which a manager and an agent can
exert e¤ort into a team production that consists of two distinct tasks with
unequal impact on the total output. Either player can be assigned to perform
either task, but both tasks must be allocated and each must be assigned to
a di¤erent player. The allocation of the tasks is determined by the manager,
who decides whether to perform the critical task (i.e. the task with the higher
impact on the output) himself or to delegate it to the agent. Furthermore,
both manager and agent are risk neutral and receive the same share of the
total output. The outcome of each task is endogenous and depends on the
true ability and the e¤ort choice of the task owner. However, the e¤ort levels
as well as the output of each task cannot be observed, and only the total
output is observable for all parties. In the rst step, we derive the e¢ cient
task allocation in the rst-best case and the utility-maximizing one chosen
by a fully rational manager. The results of our analysis show that the fully
rational manager assigns the critical task more often to the agent than is
e¢ cient. The reason is that in equilibrium the critical task requires higher
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level of e¤ort due to its higher impact on total output, and thus, causes
higher e¤ort costs than the other non-critical task. As long as the agents
ability is not too low, delegating the critical task reduces the managers ef-
fort costs more than it reduces the expected outcome. Hence, the manager
may benet from delegation. Consequently, this may lead to ine¢ cient job
distributions and lower total welfare in equilibrium. In the second step, we
derive the task allocation in equilibrium chosen by an overcondent manager
who has an overly optimistic perception of his own ability. We show that
an overcondent manager tends to hoard responsibility, i.e. to carry out the
critical task more often himself than a fully rational manager would. The
intuition is that the overcondent manager overestimates his own ability, and
consequently, expects a higher outcome when doing the critical task himself.
In particular, this kind of responsibility hoarding behavior is more likely to
be observed the larger the overcondent managers self-perception bias is.
Although responsibility hoarding is individually suboptimal for the overcon-
dent manager as he su¤ers from higher costs of e¤ort by performing the
critical task, it increases the total welfare of the involved parties, as long as
the overcondent managers self-perception bias is not too large. Moreover,
the task allocations chosen by overcondent managers may be closer to the
e¢ cient allocation than those of fully rational managers. Therefore, over-
condence can be considered as a commitment device for managers to take
up more responsibilities and increase the e¢ ciency of the job distribution,
positively a¤ecting the total welfare.
In the remainder of chapter 3, the persistence of manager overcondence
is being analyzed and discussed. Under the assumption that only the total
output is observable we show that manager overcondence and responsibility
hoarding behavior can persist in an organization, as long as the manager can
rationalize his biased overestimation of the own ability by underestimating
the ability of the agent. In this regard, our model provides three interest-
ing implications. First, manager overcondence is less robust, if the manager
carries out the critical task himself. Because of the greater impact of the crit-
ical task it is easier for the overcondent manager to rationalize his overly
optimistic self-perception by underestimating the agents contribution to the
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total outcome when the critical task is carried out by the agent. Second, man-
ager overcondence has better chance to survive if the tasks are relatively
similar with respect to their impact on total outcome. The reason is that the
negative output e¤ect of ine¢ cient task allocation causing by the overcon-
dent managers responsibility hoarding behavior is lower the more similar
the tasks are. Finally, both the managers and the agents abilities must
be relatively high to enable a persistent responsibility hoarding. Intuitively,
the more productive the agent is, the more room there is for underestima-
tion. When the agents ability is su¢ ciently high, responsibility hoarding
only occurs if the managers ability is also relatively close to the level of the
agent. Hence, persistent manager overcondence and responsibility hoarding
are more likely to be observed in rms with high-ability workers.
While the third chapter deals with the e¤ects of manager overcondence
on task allocation and team performance, chapter 4 investigates the impact
of agent overcondence on managers incentives for helping when there is
a complementarity between the agents productive e¤ort and the managers
helping e¤ort in the production technology. In the rst part of this chapter,
we introduce a model with a manager and an agent who can both exert e¤ort
into a team production. Both individuals are risk neutral and benet to the
same extent from the team output. In addition to the productive e¤ort for
her own task, the manager can provide helping to the agent. Furthermore, all
e¤ort choices are chosen simultaneously and only the total output is observ-
able for all involved parties. Similar to the previous chapter, we characterize
an overcondent agent as someone who systematically overestimates his own
ability. We start our analysis by deriving the rst-best e¤ort choices and
comparing them with the optimal e¤ort choices chosen by a manager and a
fully rational agent. Our results demonstrate the typical free-riding behavior
in a team production setting that fully rational individuals generally exert
lower productive and helping e¤orts than is e¢ cient. In a next step, we de-
rive the e¤ort choices in equilibrium with a fully rational manager and an
overcondent agent where we di¤erentiate between two possible cases, i.e.
whether the manager is aware of the agents biased self-perception or not.
Regardless of the information setting, overcondent agents generally tend
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to exert higher e¤ort to the team production than fully rational ones, even
though it is individually suboptimal as they su¤er from higher e¤ort costs.
When managers are aware of the agents biased self-perception, they will
extend their helping e¤ort, leading to higher level of cooperation and better
team outcome. Consequently, both productive and helping e¤orts may be
closer to the rst-best level than with fully rational agents.
In the second part of this chapter, we analyze the e¤ects of the agents
biased self-perception on the individualsutilities and the total welfare. Al-
though overcondence causes individually suboptimal e¤ort choices of the
agent, it is not always harmful with respect to his utility. In particular,
agent overcondence can be worthwhile for the total welfare of all involved
parties if the agents self-perception bias is on a moderate level relative to his
true ability. However, the managers awareness of the agents self-perception
bias is crucial for the positive welfare e¤ect of overcondence. Like in the
previous chapter, we also consider the persistence of agent overcondence
when only the total team output is observable. Following the same mech-
anism described above, agent overcondence can be sustained as long as
the contribution of the manager can be underestimated. Particularly, agent
overcondence is more robust if the manager has perfect information on the
agents self-perception bias. The intuition is that when the manager antici-
pates higher productive e¤ort of the overcondent agent, he will adapt the
level of helping e¤ort additionally enhancing the total output, providing the
overcondent agent more room for rationalizing his biased self-perception.
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Chapter 2
Inequality, Inequity Aversion,
and the Provision of Public
Goods1
The doctrine of equality! There is no more poisonous poison
anywhere: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it
really is the termination of justice. "Equal to the equal, unequal
to the unequal" - that would be the true slogan of justice; and
also its corollary: "Never make equal what is unequal." (Friedrich
Nietzsche)
2.1 Introduction
There is now a broad number of studies indicating that many people tend to
dislike inequity. Formal models of inequity aversion such as those by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have been quite successful
in explaining patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments and
in the eld.2 In this chapter, we analyze the e¤ect of ex-ante inequality
1This chapter is based upon Kölle et al. (2011).
2For experimental evidence see for example Roth and Kagel (1995), Camerer (2003) and
Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Using a more general notion of fairness, eld evidence is
given by e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), Campbell and Kamlani
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in wealth on the motivation of heterogeneous and inequity averse agents to
contribute to a public good. While a straightforward conjecture would be
that inequity aversion should lead to the optimality of a more egalitarian
wealth distribution, we show that the optimal degree of wealth inequality
may actually increase with the importance of inequity aversion in the agents
preferences.
We consider a simple setting in which two agents who are inequity averse
simultaneously decide on their contributions to a public good. The joined
output is increasing in each agents contribution but both agents may have
di¤erent abilities which determine the marginal e¤ect of their contributions.
When both agents benet to the same extent from the public good, equality
in initial wealth may then lead to inequity as the more able agent provides
higher inputs and, in turn, has higher costs.3 We show that this inequity is
endogenously o¤set to some degree as the agents adapt their contributions.
Treating agents of di¤erent abilities equally may then have detrimental ef-
fects for the provision of the public good. But allocating a higher wealth
to the more able agent may motivate the latter to increase her contribution.
When the distribution of initial wealth is aligned to the di¤erence in the
agentsabilities, there will be multiple equilibria in which the agents attain
the same utility even though their initial wealth di¤ers. In these equilibria
both agents have an incentive to match their group memberscontribution
and, in turn, the free-rider problem can be substantially reduced when the
agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In particular, for in-
termediate levels of wealth inequality both agents exert higher e¤orts relative
to the e¤orts maximizing their material payo¤s.
We further analyze the optimal degree of initial inequality for two simple
settings. In the rst setting, we analyze the agentsindividual preferences
for redistribution of a given amount of total initial wealth. Here, we show
that the less able agent may even benet from initial wealth inequality to
(1997), Bewley (1999) and Carpenter and Seki (2006). For a summary of the empirical
evidence on social preferences see for instance Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and Sobel (2005).
3In the following we use the term inequality describing inequality in initial wealth,
and the term inequity describing inequality in wealth after agents have contributed and
received their benets from the public good.
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her disadvantage. The reason is that the increased incentives of the more
able agent to contribute to the public good can outweigh the loss in initial
wealth. In the second setting, we show that not only a utilitarian but also an
egalitarian social planner will choose an unequal wealth distribution favoring
the more productive agent. Most strikingly, the stronger the agentsinequity
aversion, the larger should be the di¤erence in initial wealth. Moreover, we
show that an egalitarian wealth distribution can only be optimal when all
agents have the same ability. On the contrary, in the case of heterogeneous
agents such a policy always leads to a stronger underprovision of the public
good causing welfare losses. Finally, we demonstrate that under the opti-
mal distribution of wealth, total contributions are independent of the group
composition, i.e. homogeneous and heterogeneous groups provide the same
amount of the public good and identical levels of social welfare are attained.
In the existing public good literature, a well established result is that
the private provision of a public good is una¤ected by any reallocation of
income amongst contributing agents. This result has rst been shown by
Warr (1983) and later been extended by Bergstrom et al. (1986). However,
the latter also shows that an income redistribution which increases inequal-
ity by transferring wealth from non-contributing individuals to contributing
individuals can have positive welfare e¤ects (see also Itaya et al. (1997)). In
a similar vein, Andreoni (1990) argues that public good provision can be en-
hanced by redistributing wealth from less altruistic to more altruistic people.
We add to this literature by showing that redistribution can be benecial
even for the case of symmetric preferences and even if the set of contributors
is left unchanged. While the reason for inequality in our model stems from
the heterogeneity in the agentscharacteristics, the agentsfairness concerns
appear to be an important factor inuencing the optimal degree of inequality.
In recent years, there also has been a couple of (predominantly experimen-
tal) studies investigating the e¤ects of wealth heterogeneity on public good
provision. However, empirical results from these studies are not clear-cut.
While some papers nd that inequality leads to lower contributions (e.g. Os-
trom et al. (1994), Van Dijk et al. (2002), Cherry et al. (2005) and Anderson
et al. (2008)), other studies report a neutral or even positive e¤ect of wealth
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inequality (e.g. Chan et al. (1999), Buckley and Croson (2006)).4 One rea-
son for the non-conclusive evidence might be that these studies investigated
inequality only in the income dimension. Yet, the claim of our study is that
there is an interplay of inequality in the income dimension and heterogeneity
in the agentscharacteristics that a¤ect psychologicalinequity costs which
might hamper the cooperation in social dilemmas.
In this regard, our analysis also contributes to the literature on the inter-
play of equity and equality in social exchanges (e.g. Homans (1958), Adams
(1965), Konow (2000), Cappelen et al. (2007) or Konow et al. (2009)). Psy-
chological equity theory (Adams (1965)) for instance argues that individuals
do not strive to receive equal benets or make equal contributions as long
as the ratio between benets and contributions is similar. Analogously, we
show that if agents are su¢ ciently heterogenous, i.e. if the di¤erence in abil-
ities (and hence their inputs) is large, equity between agents is only feasible
when initial wealth levels are unequal suggesting that (in)equality does not
necessarily imply (in)equity and vice versa.
Applied to a team production context within rms, our study provides
insights on the question whether equal wages are always the best wage policy.
While it has often been argued that unequal reward schemes provoke morale
problems among co-workers leading to lower performances (e.g. Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999)), some other studies questioned whether equal
payment, realized by wage compression, does eliminate all these problems.5
Winter (2004), for instance, shows that it might be even optimal to reward
identical agents di¤erently as coordination can be improved which has re-
cently be conrmed in an experiment by Goerg et al. (2010). In another
experiment, Abeler et al. (2010) nd that paying equal wages after an un-
equal performance may lead to inequity and, in turn, to substantially lower
e¤orts and a decline in e¢ ciency over time. But while these papers argue for
inequality in ex-post performance rewards, our results show that it may even
be optimal to introduce ex-ante inequality in the non-performance contin-
4Chan et al. (1996) nd evidence which in line with the model of Bergstrom et al.
(1986) on an aggregate level but not an individual level.
5See e.g. Lazear (1989) who argues that ... it is far from obvious that pay equality
has these e¤ects.
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gent wage components. Furthermore, our analysis also adds to the literature
on behavioral contract theory studying the e¤ects of inequity aversion on
incentives.6 However, while in most of the studies inequity aversion leads to
more equal payment structures, our model shows that inequity aversion may
be a reason to introduce ex-ante inequality.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The model is
described in section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the equilibrium analysis. In
section 2.4, we compare the e¤ort levels chosen by inequity averse and purely
selsh agents. Section 2.5 analyzes preferences for redistribution and exam-
ines the e¤ects of distribution policies and group composition on the public
good provision and social welfare. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
Two agents i and j can both contribute to a public good. An agents contri-
bution depends on her e¤ort ei and her ability ai. Individual e¤ort costs are
linear in the exerted e¤ort and equal to c  ei, c 2 R+. The group output is
determined by the sum of both agentscontribution:
ai
p
ei + aj
p
ej:
The agents directly benet from a higher group output. Each agent receives
a share  of the group output indicating her individual valuation of the public
good (marginal per capital return). Furthermore, each agent i is provided
with an initial endowment wi.7 Let wi = wi wj be the di¤erence in initial
endowments. Both agents are inequity averse with a Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
6For a theoretical investigation of this topic see for instance Itoh (2004), Grund and
Sliwka (2005), Huck and Rey-Biel (2006), Demougin et al. (2006), Fehr et al. (2007),
Rey-Biel (2008), Dur and Glazer (2008), Mohnen et al. (2008), Kragl and Schmid (2009),
Neilson and Stowe (2010), Bartling and von Siemens (2010) and Englmaier and Wambach
(2010).
7In a team context,  represents e.g. the degree of team identication or the intrinsic
benet of the work output and wi represents the wage.
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type utility function. An agents utility is8
Ui = wi   c  ei +  
 
ai
p
ei + aj
p
ej
  v (wi   c  ei   wj + c  ej)
with
v () =
(
   if  < 0
  if  > 0
where  measures the psychological costsof disadvantageous inequity and
 that of advantageous inequity. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we
assume that     0: Additionally, we assume that   1
2
.9
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
Each agent i maximizes
max
ei
wi +  
 
ai
p
ei + aj
p
ej
  c  ei   v (wi   c  ei   wj + c  ej) :
The function is continuous but not continuously di¤erentiable as it has
a kink at ei = wic + ej where i attains the same utility as j. O¤ the kink,
the second derivative with respect to ei is  ai
p
ei
4e2i
< 0. As the right-sided
derivative at the kink is strictly smaller than the left-sided derivative, the
function is strictly concave.
We have to consider two possible equilibrium types depending on whether
there is inequity in equilibrium or whether both agents are equally well o¤.
In an inequitable equilibrium one agent i is better o¤ given the chosen e¤ort
levels, i.e. wi cei > wj cej. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. When
8Hence, we allow that the disutility from inequity v () depends on the di¤erence of
the agentsnet-wealth (rewards minus costs of e¤ort).
9Note that  > 12 connotes a very strong form of inequity aversion implying that ex-
post, agents would be willing to donate parts of their wealth to less wealthy group members
up to the point where wealth levels are completely equalized (compare Rey-Biel (2008)).
We discuss implications of this assumption at the end of section 2.3.
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agent i is better o¤, the following two conditions must hold in equilibrium
@Ui
@ei
=  c+ ai
2
p
ei
+ c = 0;
@Uj
@ej
=  c+ aj
2
p
ej
  c = 0:
The respective equilibrium e¤orts are therefore
ei =
2a2i
4 (1  )2 c2 and e

j =
2a2j
4 (1 + )2 c2
: (2.1)
Such an equilibrium exists if at these e¤ort levels we indeed have that wi  
cei > wj   cej or
wi   c 

2a2i
4 (1  )2 c2

> wj   c 

2a2j
4 (1 + )2 c2

:
This directly leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 If the di¤erence in initial wealthwi  wi wj > 24c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1+)2

,
there exists a unique inequitable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agent i is
strictly better o¤ than agent j; the equilibrium e¤ort levels satisfy:
ei =
2a2i
4 (1  )2 c2 and e

j =
2a2j
4 (1 + )2 c2
:
Note that both agents adapt their e¤orts as the contribution of the fa-
vored agent i increases in the degree of compassion  and that of her
disadvantaged counterpart j decreases in the degree of envy. Still, they
here end up a situation which is inequitable ex-post. But as the result shows
this is only the case when the initial inequality in wealth is su¢ ciently large.
We now have to check whether there are also equitable equilibria in which
both agents attain the same payo¤. In that case wi cei = wj cej and both
agents choose their e¤ort levels at the kink of the respective utility function.
An e¤ort tuple
 
ei ; e

j

can be sustained in such an equitable Nash equilibrium
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if no agent has an incentive to deviate. As the function is strictly concave,
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are
that for both agents the left hand side derivative of the utility function must
be positive at
 
ei ; e

j

, the right hand side derivative negative and wi  cei =
wj   cej . Hence, in an equitable equilibrium, the following ve conditions
must be met:
@ Ui
@ei

ei=ei
=  c+ ai
2
p
ei
+ c  0, ei  
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 (2.2)
@+Ui
@ei

ei=ei
=  c+ ai
2
p
ei
  c  0, ei  
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
(2.3)
@ Uj
@ej

ej=ej
=  c+ aj
2
p
ej
+ c  0, ej 
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 (2.4)
@+Uj
@ej

ej=ej
=  c+ aj
2
p
ej
  c  0, ej 
2a2j
4(1+)2c2
(2.5)
ej = e

i   wic (2.6)
From these conditions the following result can be derived:
Proposition 2 If 
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

 wi  24c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1+)2

; there
exists a continuum of equitable equilibria. Specically, any pair
 
ei ; e

j

of
e¤ort levels such that
max
n
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
;
2a2j
4(1+)2c2
+ wi
c
o
 ei  min
n
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 ;
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
o
(2.7)
and ej = e

i   wic is an equitable equilibrium.
Proof.
Inserting the equity condition (2.6) in conditions (2.4) and (2.5), we can
conclude that an e¤ort level ei can be sustained if and only if
max
n
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
;
2a2j
4(1+)2c2
+ wi
c
o
 ei  min
n
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 ;
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
o
:
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Note that 
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
<
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 and
2a2j
4(1+)2c2
+ wi
c
<
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
. Hence,
the set is non-empty for certain values of wi if
2a2i
4(1  )2c2 
2a2j
4(1 + )2c2
+
wi
c
and
2a2j
4(1  )2c2 +
wi
c
 
2a2i
4(1 + )2c2
which is the case when
2a2i
4(1 + )2c
  
2a2j
4(1  )2c  wi 
2a2i
4(1  )2c  
2a2j
4(1 + )2c
: (2.8)
This result has several interesting implications. First, note that there
are always multiple equitable equilibria. The reason is that inequity averse
agents have some interest to adapt their own e¤ort according to the group
members e¤ort in order to avoid the disutility from inequity. This leads to
a coordination problem as the reaction functions are upward sloping.
Second, the set of equitable equilibria dened by (2.7) is the larger, the
higher the agents degree of inequity aversion: The more the agents care
for equity, the larger is their willingness to adapt their e¤orts to reduce
inequity which may either be triggered by inequality in initial wealth or the
group members e¤ort level. The lower boundary of the equilibrium set is
decreasing in  as more enviousagents are willing to reduce their e¤orts
to avoid being worse o¤ than their group member. Analogously, the upper
boundary is increasing in  as more compassionateagents are more willing
to raise their e¤orts to reduce a group members disadvantage. Likewise,
the set dened by (2.8) is also increasing in the agents inequity aversion
implying that the stronger the agentsaversion against inequity, the larger
may be the maximal initial wealth inequality the agents are willing to o¤set
by adapting their contributions ending up in an equitable equilibrium.
Finally, note that the lower boundary for wi as dened by condition
(2.8) exceeds zero (or the upper boundary is smaller than zero) when the
abilities di¤er strongly and inequity aversion is not too strong. In these cases,
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equitable equilibria never exist when wi = 0 and, hence, equity cannot be
attained when wealth is distributed equally. The reason is that due to the
higher marginal productivity of e¤ort, the more productive agent will have
a higher incentive to exert more e¤ort than her less productive fellow agent
and, in turn, bears higher costs. But as both agents benet equally from the
public good the more able agent is worse o¤when both have the same initial
wealth.10
Figure 2.1 shows the sustainable equilibrium e¤ort levels of both agents
i and j as a correspondence of wi.11 There are two cut-o¤ values for wi.
For small values of wi (=  wj) below 24c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

there is a
unique inequitable equilibrium with ei =
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
and ej =
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 . For
large values of wi above
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1+)2

there is a unique inequitable
equilibrium with ei =
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 and e

j =
2a2j
4(1+)2c2
. For intermediate values of
wi equitable equilibria exist.
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
1
2
3
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
1
2
3
Figure 2.1: E¤ort Choice of agent i (left) and j (right) depending on wi
Note that as both agents attain identical payo¤s in an equitable equilib-
rium, they prefer the same one. Consequently, it is important to compare
the di¤erent feasible equitable equilibria with respect to the agentsutility
which leads to the following result:
10Note that this is always the case when the agents are purely selsh (i.e.  =  = 0).
11The gure shows a setting in which ai = 12; aj = 10;  = 0:4;  = 0:2;  = 0:2; and
c = 1.
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Corollary 1 As long as   1
2
the equitable equilibrium in which the agents
utility is highest is always Pareto optimal within the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. See the appendix.
To understand this result note that there is a free-rider problem which
is particularly strong when agents are selsh. Inequity aversion helps to
overcome this free-rider problem as it allows agents to coordinate on higher
e¤ort levels which come closer to the rst best. As long as  does not exceed 1
2
the highest feasible equilibrium is still lower than the rst-best and therefore
is preferred by the agents.12 With a  larger than 1
2
, however, inequity
aversion becomes so strong that an agent even would have an incentive to
match an ine¢ ciently high e¤ort level chosen by her group member even
though both would be better o¤ with a lower e¤ort.
Hence, both agents benet from playing the equitable equilibrium with
the highest sustainable e¤ort level when they are not extremely compassion-
ate. This e¤ort level is equal to min
n
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 ;
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
o
and, hence,
strictly increasing in the degree of advantageous inequity aversion .
2.4 Do inequity averse agents contribute more?
We now compare the attained e¤ort levels with those chosen by purely selsh
agents to study the e¤ects of inequity aversion on the motivation to con-
tribute to the public good. From Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Corollary 1
(assuming that the agents play the Pareto best equitable equilibrium)13 we
know that the equilibrium e¤ort levels of inequity averse agents
 
ei ; e

j

are
12The agentsrst-best e¤orts can be derived by maximizing wi + wj   c  ei   c  ej +
2   aipei + ajpej and are given by eFBi = 2a2ic2 and eFBj = 2a2jc2 :
13Cooper et al. (1992), Blume and Ortmann (2007) for instance nd experimentally
that simple ex-ante cheap talk communication indeed very frequently leads to the choice
of the pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in coordination games. See Demichelis and Weibull
(2008) for a theoretical argument based on lexicographic preferences for honesty.
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given by8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

2a2i
4(1+)2c2
;
2a2j
4(1 )2c2

if wi <
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
;
2a2j
4(1 )2c2

if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2
i
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 ;
2a2i
4(1 )2c2   wic

if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2
i
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 ;
2a2j
4(1+)2c2

if wi >
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2

(2.9)
as depicted by the solid upper boundary of the graphs in Figure 2.1. Note
that both functions are continuous and weakly monotonic.
Suppose, w.l.o.g., that i is the more able agent i.e. ai  aj. Purely
selsh agentse¤ort choices are not a¤ected by initial wealth inequality as
they consider only their marginal returns when choosing their e¤orts. Hence,
e¤orts are given by14
eselfishi =
2a2i
4c2
and eselfishj =
2a2j
4c2
: (2.10)
By comparing these e¤ort levels of selsh agents with those of inequity
averse agents as given by (2.9) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If 
2a2i
4c
  2a2j
4(1 )2c < wi <
2a2i
4(1 )2c  
2a2j
4c
; both agents con-
tribute more when they are inequity averse (i.e. ei > e
selfish
i and e

j >
eselfishj ). If wi  
2a2i
4(1 )2c 
2a2j
4c
; inequity aversion motivates agent i to exert
higher e¤orts but de-motivates agent j (i.e. ei > e
selfish
i and e

j < e
selfish
j ).
The opposite holds if wi  
2a2i
4c
  2a2j
4(1 )2c .
Proof. By comparing (2.9) with (2.10) it is straightforward to see that ei >
eselfishi if wi  
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

and ei < e
selfish
i if wi  
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

.
We only have to check the case in whichwi 2

2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

.
In this case ei > e
selfish
i if
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
>
2a2i
4c2
, wi > 
2a2i
4c
  2a2j
4(1 )2c :
14To see that, just replace  =  = 0 in the equilibrium e¤orts given by (2.1).
21
Hence, we can conclude that ei > e
selfish
i if wi exceeds this cut-o¤.
15 Anal-
ogously, ej > e
selfish
j if wj =  wi >
2a2j
4c
  2a2i
4(1 )2c which gives us the
upper boundary. It is straightforward to check that the interval in which
both ei > e
selfish
i and e

j > e
selfish
j is non-empty.
Hence, the initial wealth di¤erential wi is crucial to determine how in-
equity averse agents adapt their e¤ort choices relative to the e¤orts maximiz-
ing their material payo¤s. For intermediate levels of initial wealth inequality,
inequity aversion indeed helps to reduce the free-rider problem as both agents
contribute more when coordinating on the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
But if initial wealth inequality becomes stronger, inequity aversion leads
to an asymmetric reaction as the favored agent chooses a higher e¤ort than
the level maximizing her material payo¤ and the disadvantaged contributes
less than would be optimal from a payo¤ maximizing perspective.
But it is important to note that the latter demotivating e¤ect may arise
for the more able agent even when she is richer than her less able colleague:
The lower boundary for wi in Proposition 3 is larger than zero if
2a2i
4c
  2a2j
4(1 )2c > 0, ai >
aj
1   :
Hence, when ai is much larger than aj or when  is su¢ ciently small, the
more able agent reduces her e¤ort below eselfishi unless wi exceeds a strictly
positive cut-o¤value. Or, in other words, she has to be paid su¢ ciently more
than her colleague or otherwise will reduce her e¤ort below the selshly opti-
mal level. To understand the reason for this e¤ect, note again that the payo¤
maximizing e¤ort is always larger for the more able agent as her marginal
returns to e¤ort are higher. As both equally benet from the public good,
she is worse o¤ than her less able colleague when both have the same initial
wealth. But when being inequity averse she su¤ers from this disadvantage
which is the higher the larger ai relative to aj. If  is high, the more able
agent will still choose an equilibrium e¤ort level above eselfishi as also her less
able but compassionatecounterpart puts in a su¢ ciently high e¤ort and
they can coordinate to a superior equilibrium. But when  is small, she can
15Note that this cut-o¤ is indeed always in the interior of the relevant interval.
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only reduce inequity by lowering her e¤ort. Hence, not awarding the more
able agent more money up front leads to an unfair distribution of payo¤s
and, in turn, to lower e¤orts.
2.5 Social welfare, redistribution, and group
composition
We proceed by analyzing redistribution preferences of a) the agents and b)
a social planner who can allocate a xed budget. We further investigate the
welfare consequences of a policy implementing an egalitarian wealth distri-
bution irrespective of the distribution of the agents abilities. Finally, we
examine the e¤ect of group composition under the optimal distribution of
the initial wealth.
2.5.1 Individual preferences for redistribution
We rst study the agentsex-ante preferences on the initial wealth di¤erential
wi when they take into account their equilibrium e¤ort choices. These
considerations will be a useful starting point for welfare analysis. To do that,
it is instructive to consider a situation in which a certain budgetW = wi+wj
can be distributed between the two agents. By inserting the equilibrium e¤ort
choices (2.9) into the agentsutility functions we can describe their utility as
a function of the initial wealth di¤erential wi. Analyzing the shape of the
indirect utility functions we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 The agentsutility function is continuous in wi. If wi <
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

or wi >
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2

an agent is utility is strictly in-
creasing in wi. But between these two cut-o¤ values it is strictly decreasing.
Both agentsutility functions attain a local maximum at wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

.
Proof. See the appendix.
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This result is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The solid line shows agent is
utility and the dashed line agent js utility both as a function of wi.16
For extreme values of wi each agent benets from a redistribution in her
favor and there is a straightforward conict of interest between both agents.
But in the interval between 
2
4c

a2j
(1 )2 
a2i
(1+)2

and 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2

both
agentsinterests are fully aligned. The reason is that within this interval only
equitable equilibria exist, and hence, any ex-ante inequality in wealth will be
o¤set by adapted e¤ort levels. Moreover, all values ofwi within this interval
are Pareto-dominated by a initial wealth di¤erential of wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

as
at this point, agents can coordinate on an equilibrium leading to the highest
contributions.
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Figure 2.2: Agent is and agent js utilities in equilibrium depending on wi
Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. Consider the situation
of an individual agent who can (re-)distribute a given wealth allocation.
Interestingly, an individual may benet from ex-ante redistribution at her
own expense as the following result shows:
16The gure shows a setting in which ai = 12; aj = 10;  = 0:4;  = 0:2;  = 0:2; and
c = 1.
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Corollary 2 If both agents receive the same initial wealth (i.e. wi = 0)
the less able agent j can be made better o¤ by reducing her own initial wealth
by 
2
8c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

and transferring this money to the more able colleague i if
 > 1 
3 4
q 
2
 
62   7 + 2+ 2(1 )2
(3 4)   1:
If  is smaller than this cut-o¤, such a transfer is still benecial for agent j
when her ability is not to small, i.e. if
aj
ai
> min
(
1 
1+
;
r
1
(1 2)

4(1 )2
(1+)
+ 1  4 (1  )  2(1 )2
(1+)2
)
:
Proof. See the appendix.
Hence, a less able agent can be better o¤ ex-post when sacricing parts
of her initial wealth which are then transferred to a more able individual.
She then benets from this colleagues higher willingness to contribute to the
public good and this helps to reduce the free-rider problem. Interestingly, this
is always the case irrespective of the di¤erence in abilities if  is su¢ ciently
large. Moreover, note that the cut-o¤ value for  is equal to 1
3
when  = 0
and strictly decreasing in . Hence, this condition holds for moderate values
of  even when the agents only su¤er from disadvantageous inequity. The
reason is that a more able agent resents being worse o¤ than her less able
colleague when exerting a higher e¤ort due to her higher productivity. But
she is willing to exert higher e¤orts when she earns more. Therefore, a less
able agent may benet when her colleagues income is increased because, in
turn, this colleague is willing to contribute more.
If  is rather small, the result still holds if the less able agents produc-
tivity is not too small relative to her more able colleagues productivity. If,
however, her ability is much smaller the transfer necessary to implement a
performance maximizing equitable equilibrium is too large such that agent j
prefers to stick with the case in which both receive the same initial wealth
although this leads to a lower group output.
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2.5.2 Social welfare
We now study a situation in which an external authority can decide on the
distribution of wealth. To do so, we consider, a social planner who has a social
welfare function which is either egalitarian (i.e. who wants to maximize the
utility of the least well-o¤) or utilitarian (i.e. wants to maximize the sum of
both agentsutility). It directly follows from Proposition 4 that such a social
planner always has a dominant choice:
Corollary 3 A social planner who is either utilitarian or egalitarian will set
wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that within the set of initial wealth di¤er-
entials inducing equitable equilibria both egalitarian and utilitarian planners
will always choosewi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

as at this spread, both the sum and the
minimum of the agentsutilities are maximized. Moreover, for an egalitar-
ian social planner any wealth di¤erential which is not inducing an equitable
equilibrium is always dominated by this choice as the utility of the least well
o¤ agent is always lower in an inequitable equilibrium. To see this formally
note that when, w.l.o.g., j is favored @ui
@wi
= 1
2
+  > 0 for all wi inducing
an inequitable equilibrium (see (2.12) in the proof of Proposition 4) and as
the utility function is continuous, is utility is always larger in an equitable
equilibrium.
A utilitarian social planner will neither choose a wealth distribution in-
ducing an inequitable equilibrium, as in an inequitable equilibrium which,
w.l.o.g., favors agent j; the marginal gain from transferring money to agent i
@ui
@wi
= 1
2
+  is always larger than js marginal loss which is equal to 1
2
  
(see again (2.12)).
Hence, even an egalitarian social planner who only considers the utility of
the least well o¤ individual should allow for inequality in initial wealth. The
reason is that it is precisely this inequality in initial wealth induces an equi-
librium in which equity is attained ex-post and in which the more able agent
is willing to contribute more. This observation bears some resemblance to
the result by Andreoni (1990) who argues that redistribution of income will
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increase the total contribution if it benets the more altruistic individuals.17
It directly follows that the implementation of an egalitarian wealth distri-
bution policy has detrimental e¤ects if the group considered is not entirely
homogenous in terms of abilities.
2.5.3 Optimal group composition
So far, we only considered how wealth should be distributed treating the
composition of agents within a group as exogenously given. However, it is
also interesting to study the case in which the formation of groups can be
determined as well. A straightforward conjecture is that group composition
matters for the willingness to contribute if the agents are inequity averse
towards their fellow group members. To investigate this, we consider a simple
situation in which there are four agents, two of high ability and two of low
ability, that can be assigned into two groups of two. By comparing total
contributions, we can derive the following result:
Proposition 5 If all agents have the same initial wealth, total contributions
are always higher with homogenous than with heterogenous groups. But when
wealth can be adapted optimally, total contributions are independent of the
group composition.
Proof. Let aH > aL be the ability of the high and low productive agent and
let wH and wL denote the initial wealth levels of the two agents, respectively.
Given the same initial wealth (w = wH   wL = 0) the total contribution
with two homogenous groups is equal to
22a2H
4(1 )2c2 +
22a2L
4(1 )2c2 =
2(a2H+a2L)
2(1 )2c2 : (2.11)
With heterogenous groups it is given by
2a2H
2(1+)2c2
+
2a2L
2(1 )2c2 if w <
2
4c

a2H
(1+)2
  a2L
(1 )2

2(a2L+a2L)
2(1 )2c2 if w 2
h
2
4c

a2H
(1+)2
  a2L
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2H a2L
(1 )2
i :
17Similarly, with respect to social welfare, Thurow (1971) argues that some redistribution
of income is necessary in order to achieve a Pareto optimum.
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In both cases, the expression is strictly smaller than (2.11).
If, however, the distribution of the initial wealth can be optimally adapted,
i.e. w = 
2
4c

a2H a2L
(1 )2

, the total contribution of two heterogenous groups is
2

2a2H
4(1 )2c2 +
2a2H
4(1 )2c2   w

c

=
22a2H
4(1 )2c2 +
22a2H
4(1 )2c2   2
2
4c2

a2H a2L
(1 )2

=
22(a2H+a2L)
4(1 )2c2 :
But this is equal to the total contribution of the homogenous groups which
is again given by (2.11) as w = 0 is optimal in this case.
Hence, when the wealth level is xed and equally distributed it is ben-
ecial to have homogenous groups. The reason is straightforward from the
analysis above: Heterogeneity in abilities leads to a de-motivation of the
more qualied agent when wealth is equally distributed. By matching agents
into homogenous teams, this de-motivational e¤ect can be avoided and group
homogeneity helps the agents to coordinate on more favorable equilibria.
It is, however, interesting to note that group composition is irrelevant
for total contributions when the wealth level can be optimally adapted. In
this case, the disadvantage of the more able agent can be entirely o¤set
and, in turn, motivation to contribute is restored to the levels attainable in
homogenous groups.
2.6 Conclusion
We analyzed the e¤ects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute
to a public good when agents are inequity averse. We have shown that it
is optimal to introduce ex-ante inequality in wealth if agents di¤er in their
abilities. The reason is that inequality in favor of a more able agent can
motivate this agent to exert higher e¤orts. In particular, the stronger the
agentsinequity aversion, the stronger is also this incentive e¤ect of inequality
and the larger should be the di¤erence in initial wealth. Furthermore, we
have shown that compared to the case when agents are purely self-interested,
contributions are higher when agents are inequity averse as inequity aversion
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helps to reduce the free-rider problem and agents can coordinate on higher
e¤orts.
Our results have several interesting implications. First of all, they cast
doubt on simple statements sometimes heard in practice claiming that in-
equality among the members of a group is demotivating when people care
for fairness. While this is indeed true for very large wealth di¤erentials in
our model, the opposite can also be the case, when wealth di¤erentials are
too small. Allocating agents of di¤erent abilities the same initial wealth can
lead to highly inequitable situations. The reason is that in a public good set-
ting, all agents equally benet from the group output, but more able agents
exert higher e¤orts as their marginal returns to e¤ort are higher and, in turn,
they incur higher costs. When agents are inequity averse this can demoti-
vate the more able agents which is bad for the overall performance as their
contributions are more valuable.
The results also may cast some light on the discussion about distributional
politics (Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Durante and Putterman (2009)) and
the e¤ects on citizenswillingness to voluntary donate to a common good.
Some previous studies (e.g. Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986)) have
argued that the total provision of a public good is independent of the dis-
tribution of wealth. In contrast, our results indicate that equality in wealth
may crowd-out the motivation to contribute. But introducing inequality may
have positive e¤ects on the citizenswillingness to work for the common good.
However, our model also shows that this is the case only if the higher wealth
is in the hands of those who can provide the most valuable contributions.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Corollary 1:
The value of emaxi directly follows from the upper boundary given by (2.7).
Let
vEi (ei) = wi   cei + 

ai
p
ei + aj
q
ei   wic

be agent is utility which is equal to agent js utility in any equitable equilib-
rium. To compare the equilibria in the set dened by (2.7) we have to check
which value of ei maximizes this utility. Note that
@vEi (ei)
@ei
=  c+ 
0@ ai
2
p
ei
+
aj
2
q
ei   wic
1A and
@2vEi (ei)
@e2i
= 
 
 ai
4
e
  3
2
i  
aj
4

ei   wi
c
  3
2
!
< 0:
As vEi (ei) is strictly concave,
@vEi (ei)
@ei

ei=emaxi
 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for emaxi to be Pareto optimal. If wi <
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1 )2

; emaxi
is equal to
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
and the condition is equivalent to
 c+ 
0@ai 1
2
r
2a2
j
4(1 )2c2+
wi
c
+ aj
1
2
r
2a2
j
4(1 )2c2+
wi
c
 wi
c
1A  0,
wi  
2
4c

a2i
2
  a
2
j
(1  )2

.
But 
2
4c

a2i
2
  a2j
(1 )2

 2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1 )2

as long as   1
2
. Hence,
both agents utility is maximal at emaxi in this case. If, however, wi 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1 )2

; emaxi is equal to
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 and the condition is equivalent
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to
 c+ 
0@ai 1
2
r
2a2
i
4(1 )2c2
+ aj
1
2
r
2a2
i
4(1 )2c2 
wi
c
1A  0,
wi  
2
4c

a2i
(1  )2  
a2j
2

But 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
2

 2
4c

a2i
(1 )2  
a2j
(1 )2

is again equivalent to   1
2
.
2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 4:
By substituting the equilibrium e¤orts (2.9) into agent is utility function we
obtain:
ui =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
W+wi
2
+ 

ai
q
2a2i
4(1+)2c2
+ aj
r
2a2j
4(1 )2c2

  2a2i
4(1+)2c
+ 

wi   
2a2i
4(1+)2c
+
2a2j
4(1 )2c

if wi <
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

W+wi
2
+ 

ai
q
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
+ aj
q
2a2j
4(1 )2c2

 

2a2j
4(1 )2c +wi

if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2
i
W+wi
2
+ 

ai
q
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 + aj
q
2a2i
4(1 )2c2   wic

  2a2i
4(1 )2c
if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2
i
W+wi
2
+ 

ai
q
2a2i
4(1 )2c2 + aj
r
2a2j
4(1+)2c2

  2a2i
4(1 )2c   

wi   
2a2i
4(1 )2c +
2a2j
4(1+)2c

if wi >
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2

:
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The rst derivative of this function is
@ui
@wi
=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1
2
+  if wi <
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

 1
2
+ ai
2c
r
2a2
j
4(1 )2c2+
wi
c
if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2
i
1
2
  aj
2c
r
2a2
i
4(1 )2c2 
wi
c
if wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2
i
1
2
   if wi > 24c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2

:
(2.12)
Note that the slope in the second interval is strictly positive if
 1
2
+
  ai
2c
q
2a2j
4(1 )2c2 +
wi
c
> 0,
2
4c

4a2i  
a2j
(1  )2

> wi
which is always true for any wi 2
h
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2
h
and
  1
2
: Furthermore, it is always positive at wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

for any   1
2
and equal to zero if and only if  = 1
2
:
Similarly, the slope in third interval is strictly negative if
1
2
+   aj
 1
c
2
q
2a2i
4(1 )2c2   wic
< 0,
2
4c

a2i
(1  )2   4a
2
j

< wi
which is always true as well for any wi 2
i
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

; 
2
4c

a2i
(1 )2 
a2j
(1+)2
i
and   1
2
: Furthermore, it is always negative at wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

for any
  1
2
and equal to zero if and only if  = 1
2
:
2.7.3 Proof of Corollary 2:
The utility of agent j at wi = 0 is always smaller as compared to wi =
2
4c

a2i a2j
(1 )2

if agent js utility function is increasing at wi = 0 which is the
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case when
0 > 
2
4c

a2i
(1+)2
  a2j
(1 )2

, aj
ai
> 1 
1+
:
If this is not the case we have to compare the utility of the less able agent
j at the local maximum of both agentsutility function
W
2
  
2(a2i+a2j)
8(1 )2c +
2(a2i+a2j)
2(1 )c
with her utility at wi = 0, which for
aj
ai
< 1 
1+
is given by
W
2
+
2a2j
2(1 )c +
2a2i
2(1+)c
  2a2j
4(1 )2c + 

2a2j
4(1 )2c  
2a2i
4(1+)2c

:
Hence, agent j is better o¤ with an unequal income when
a2j
a2i
> 1
(1 2)

4(1 )2
(1+)
+ 1  4 (1  )  2(1 )2
(1+)2

:
Note that if

4(1 )2
(1+)
+ 1  4 (1  )  2(1 )2
(1+)2

< 0 this holds for all
values of aj. As 4   3 < 0 this condition is equivalent to
(1 + )  2(1 )2
(3 4)
2
> 2(1 )
2
(3 4)2
 
62   7 + 2 :
Note that 62 7+2 > 0 as this function is = 0 at  = 1
2
and decreasing
for 0 <  < 1
2
: Rearranging the equation gives
 > 1 
3 4
q
2
 
62   7 + 2+ 2(1 )2
(3 4)   1
which proves the rst claim. If, however,

4(1 )2
(1+)
+ 1  4 (1  )  2(1 )2
(1+)2

>
0; the condition is equivalent to
aj
ai
>
r
1
(1 2)

4(1 )2
(1+)
+ 1  4 (1  )  2(1 )2
(1+)2

which establishes the second claim.
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Chapter 3
Overcondence and Managers
Responsibility Hoarding1
3.1 Introduction
Overcondence is a well-established behavioral pattern that involves overes-
timating the own capabilities, especially in tasks with a partially stochastic
outcome (Svenson (1981), Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Russo and Schoemaker
(1992), Soll (1996)). Although the degree of overcondence may vary with
the type of task (Grieco and Hogarth (2009)), it is generally found to persist
when individuals assess the probability of their own success or the relative
standing of their performance compared to others (Klayman et al. (1999)).
While the behavioral pattern of overcondence and its e¤ects on nancial
decision-making have been studied extensively (see for instance De Bondt
and Thaler (1996)), the e¤ects of overcondence on organizational perfor-
mance are not fully understood yet. In particular, the question how manager
overcondence a¤ects organizational performance by biasing the managers
delegation and task distribution choices has not been studied so far.
To investigate these e¤ects, we introduce a model, in which a manager and
an agent can exert e¤ort into a joint production that consists of two distinct
tasks with unequal impact on the output. The allocation of the tasks is at the
1This chapter is based upon Nieken et al. (2011).
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discretion of the manager, who decides whether to perform the "critical" task
(i.e. the task with the higher impact on the output) himself or to delegate it
to the agent.2
We show that an overcondent manager tends to hoard responsibility,
i.e. to assign the critical task more often to himself than a fully rational
manager would. Responsibility hoarding takes place, even though it is indi-
vidually suboptimal for the manager, who su¤ers from a higher cost of e¤ort
by performing the critical task instead of the other task.
We also show that, despite adding to the overcondent managers e¤ort
cost, responsibility hoarding may actually increase the total welfare of the
involved parties. As long as the overcondent managers self-perception bias
is not too large, the total welfare e¤ect can be positive, because the amount
of e¤ort exerted by the overcondent manager is closer to the e¢ cient level
than the amount provided by a fully rational manager, who chooses a pay-
o¤ maximizing e¤ort level, generally below the welfare maximizing level.
Hence, by overestimating his own productivity and exerting a correspond-
ingly greater amount of e¤ort, the overcondent manager typically engages
in less free-riding than his rational counterpart.
Finally, we show that responsibility hoarding can persist in an organiza-
tion, as long as the overcondent manager can rationalize the overestimation
of the own ability by underestimating the ability of the agent. The more
leeway an overcondent manager has to rationalize the observed outcome
without having to adapt his positively biased assessment of the own ability
level, the more likely it is to observe persistent individually suboptimal but
welfare improving delegation behavior in an organization.
Most of the existing literature on overcondence in managerial settings is
focused on the exaggerated investment risks taken by overcondent managers.
While Barber and Odean (2000) and Deaves et al. (2008) report excessive
trading by overcondent traders, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) observe exces-
sive market entries in an experimental setting. Malmendier and Tate (2005)
2We use the male pronoun for the manager and the female pronoun for the agent,
because males are generally found to exhibit a higher degree of overcondence than females
(see e.g. Barber and Odean (2001), Correll (2001), Bengtsson et al. (2005)).
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argue that managerial overcondence leads to distortive investment behavior
and demonstrate that data on CEO investments in the own company are in
line with their overcondence model. Hackbarth (2008) shows that overcon-
dent managers tend to bias the capital structure of the rm towards higher
debt levels. Similar results can be found in Ben-David et al. (2007) who show
that companies with overcondent CFOs have a signicantly di¤erent cap-
ital structure than other rms. Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2008)
nd that overcondent managers also tend to overpay in mergers and even
initiate value-destroying ones. Interestingly, this bias is sometimes advanta-
geous for the rm value. For instance, Palomino and Sadrieh (2011) show
that managerial overcondence can be advantageous concerning nancial de-
cisions. They analyze a model in which overcondent portfolio managers,
who share prots, may exhibit risk attitudes that are more in line with the
investorsrisk attitude than fully rational risk-averse managers. Analyzing
data of large publicly traded rms from 1980 to 1994, Galasso and Simcoe
(2011) present evidence that overcondent CEOs have a signicantly higher
probability to initiate corporate innovation.
In a team production setting, Gervais and Goldstein (2007) study a rm
with complementary production technology and show that the presence of
an overcondent agent can increase the rm output as it helps the agents
to coordinate on a high e¤ort level, and therefore, overcome the free-rider
problem. Furthermore, Santos-Pinto (2008) shows that rms can benet
from using interdependent incentive schemes when workers exhibit mistaken
beliefs about their coworkersabilities. Regarding individual performance,
Weinberg (2009) for instance shows that a moderate overestimation of own
ability can also be advantageous relative to a realistic assessment as it lets
overcondent individuals undertake more challenging tasks that might raise
their expected output and utility. Recent experimental ndings by Sautmann
(2011) support the theory that overcondent agents accept lower wage o¤ers,
while Santos-Pinto (2010) shows that rms using tournaments as incentives
can make higher prots if agents have a positive self image. Similarly, Ludwig
et al. (2011b) nd that moderate overcondence can improve the agents per-
formance in a Tullock contest relative to an unbiased opponent resulting in
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an advantage for the overcondent agent. These results are supported by the
recent experiment of Kinari et al. (2011) who report overcondence to have a
signicant impact on increasing productivity in tournaments. Furthermore,
Englmaier (2011) argues that rms should hire overoptimistic managers to
ensure the implementation of certain investment strategies in R&D tourna-
ments.
Regarding the literature dealing with the delegation of tasks in a principal-
agent model, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to take overcon-
dence into account. Prendergast (1995) suggests a model where a manager
has discretion over task assignments. In this setting, the manager may ex-
hibit responsibility hoarding, i.e. does not delegate enough and carries out
too many tasks himself. This is driven by the assumption that the manager
can earn future rents from the on-the-job training that performing the ad-
ditional tasks provides.3 If the output of several tasks cannot be measured
separately and the principal has to delegate at least one task, Itoh (1994)
and Itoh (2001) nd that the principal will execute some tasks himself or
delegate all tasks to only one agent if the agents are risk adverse. Gürtler
(2008) extends this model and compares partial delegation where the princi-
pal carries out one task and the other task is carried out by the agent with
complete delegation with specialization of the agents on one certain task.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The basic model
is described in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we present the rst-best task
allocation and the individually optimal task allocation that is chosen by
the manager under perfect information on the agents ability and analyze
the e¤ects of manager overcondence on total welfare. In section 3.4, we
consider the persistence of manager overcondence and the underestimation
of the agents ability by an overcondent manager. In section 3.5, we discuss
and outline the range of optimal and persistent manager overcondence and
responsibility-hoarding constellations. Section 3.6 concludes.
3This model of rational responsibility hoarding is especially useful when studying pro-
fessions with extraordinary high rents for job experience, e.g. surgeons, pilots, or lawyers.
Note, however, that even in such settings any degree of rational responsibility hoarding
may be amplied by the managers overcondence.
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3.2 The model
Consider a joint production setting, in which a manager and an agent can
exert e¤ort to generate a shared output. The total output Y is a function
of the outcomes Y1 and Y2 of the tasks 1 and 2, correspondingly. A crucial
assumption is that the two tasks di¤er in their impact on the total output,
where w.l.o.g. we assume that task 1 is the critical task, i.e. it tends to
have higher impact on total output than the non-critical task 2. Using an
additive production function, we introduce the parameter  that measures
the relative impact of task 1 compared to task 2. Hence, the total output Y
is dened as:
Y = Y1 + (1  )Y2; with  2

1
2
; 1

For simplicity, both manager and agent are risk neutral and benet to
the same extent from the total output, i.e. both individuals receive the same
share of
1
2
Y . We assume that the e¤ort levels as well as the output of both
tasks is not observable by the rm. Only the total output Y is observable
for all parties. Either player can be assigned to perform either task, where
the task allocation is chosen by the manager at the outset of each period.
The allocation must be complete and bijective, i.e. both tasks must be
allocated and each must be allocated to a di¤erent player, because no player
can perform both tasks in the same period. The outcome of each task j is
endogenous, depending on the true ability ai and the chosen e¤ort ei of the
player i performing the task:
Yj = ai  ei; with i =M [anager]; A[gent] and j = 1; 2:
Furthermore, the individual e¤ort cost C(ei) is strictly convex:
C(ei) =
c
2
e2i ; c 2 R+:
To simplify the discussion, we distinguish between those task allocation
choices, in which the critical task 1 is performed by the manager (non-
delegation), and those, in which the critical task 1 is allocated to the agent
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(delegation). More formally we dene:
Denition 1 A delegation choice is a task allocation in which the critical
task 1 is allocated to the agent and the non-critical task 2 is allocated to the
manager. In case of non-delegation the critical task 1 is allocated to the
manager and the non-critical task 2 is carried out by the agent.
Denition 2 A task allocation is individually optimal if it maximizes the
managers utility.
Denition 3 A task allocation is e¢ cient if it maximizes the total welfare
of all involved parties.
Following Gervais and Goldstein (2007) we characterize an overcondent
manager as someone who systematically overestimates his own ability:
Denition 4 An overcondent manager has an overly optimistic percep-
tion of his own ability, i.e.
aOCM = aM + b
where aM denotes the managers true ability and the parameter b > 0 his
self-perception bias or the degree of his overcondence.
Finally, we use the denitions above to characterize responsibility hoard-
ing.
Denition 5 Responsibility hoarding occurs when a manager performs
the critical task (task 1) himself, even though a delegation choice is individ-
ually optimal for him.
3.3 Perfect information on agents ability
In the rst step, we assume that the agents ability is common knowledge, i.e.
both the manager and the agent have perfect information on the agents abil-
ity. We start by investigating the e¢ cient task allocation choice (rst-best
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case) and then proceed to the delegation choices of a fully rational manager
and of an overcondent manager. Comparing the three results, we rst show
that fully rational managers delegate the critical task more often than is
e¢ cient. Next, we show that manager overcondence always leads to less
delegation compared to an equilibrium with fully rational managers. Finally,
we prove that the managers biased self-perception may increase e¢ ciency,
because responsibility hoarding can be benecial for the total welfare of the
involved parties, as long as the increase in the overcondent managers con-
tribution to rm output over-compensates the loss due to his individually
suboptimal delegation and e¤ort choices.
3.3.1 E¢ cient task allocation (rst-best case)
Assume that the critical task 1 is carried out by the manager and task 2 is
assigned to the agent. The outcomes of the two tasks are then given by
Y nd1 = aMeM
Y nd2 = aAeA
(3.1)
where the index nd denotes the case of non-delegation.
In the rst-best case the total welfare of the involved parties is maximized
by:
max
eM ;eA
W nd = (aMeM + (1  ) aAeA)  c
2
e2M  
c
2
e2A
which leads to the rst-best e¤ort levels given by
endFBM =
aM
c
endFBA =
(1  ) aA
c
:
Hence, the total welfare in case of non-delegation is equal to
W ndFB =
2a2M
2c
+
(1  )2 a2A
2c
: (3.2)
Next, assume that the critical task 1 is assigned to the agent and task 2
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is carried out by the manager. Now, the outcomes of both tasks are given by
Y d1 = aAeA
Y d2 = aMeM
(3.3)
where the index d denotes the case of delegation.
In this case, the welfare maximization problem becomes
max
eM ;eA
W d = ((1  ) aMeM + aAeA)  c
2
e2M  
c
2
e2A
which leads to the rst-best e¤ort levels described by
edFBM =
(1  ) aM
c
edFBA =
aA
c
:
Hence, the total welfare in case of delegation is equal to
W dFB =
(1  )2 a2M
2c
+
2a2A
2c
: (3.4)
Comparing (3.2) and (3.4), delegation is e¢ cient if and only if
aM  aA:
Proposition 1 In the e¢ cient task allocation the critical task should be allo-
cated to the agent if and only if her ability is at least as high as the managers
ability, i.e. aM  aA: Otherwise, the critical task should better be assigned to
the manager.
It is straightforward that maximizing the total welfare requires that the
critical task (i.e. the task with a higher impact on the total output) to be
carried out by the individual with the higher ability. Moreover, the positive
welfare e¤ect of delegation is the higher the higher the agents ability is.
However, it is not obvious that the welfare maximizing task allocation will
generally be implemented when the task allocation is chosen by the manager.
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3.3.2 Optimal delegation choice of a fully rational man-
ager
Now, assume that the task allocation is chosen by a fully rational manager,
maximizing his individual utility. Assume that the manager does not dele-
gate, i.e. the critical task (task 1) is carried out by the manager and other
task (task 2) is assigned to the agent. The outcomes of the two tasks are
then given by (3.1).
In contrast to the rst-best case, the managers utility is now maximized
with:
max
eM
UndM =
1
2
(aMeM + (1  ) aAeA)  c
2
e2M
which leads to his individually optimal e¤ort level described by
endM =
aM
2c
:
Furthermore, the agents optimization is given by
max
eA
UndA =
1
2
(aMeM + (1  ) aAeA)  c
2
e2A
and her individually optimal e¤ort level is
endA =
(1  ) aA
2c
:
Since we assume that the manager has perfect information about the
agents ability, his utility is equal to
UndM =
2a2M
8c
+
(1  )2 a2A
4c
: (3.5)
Next, assume that the manager delegates, i.e. the critical task 1 is as-
signed to the agent and task 2 is carried out by the manager. Now, the
outcomes of both tasks are given by (3.3).
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In this case, the managers optimization problem is
max
eM
UdM =
1
2
((1  ) aMeM + aAeA)  c
2
e2M
with
e dM =
(1  ) aM
2c
as his individually optimal e¤ort level.
For the agent, the optimization is given by
max
eA
UdA =
1
2
((1  ) aMeM + aAeA)  c
2
e2A
which leads to an individually optimal e¤ort level of
edA =
aA
2c
:
Hence, the managers utility in case of delegation is equal to
UdM =
(1  )2 a2M
8c
+
2a2A
4c
: (3.6)
Now, by comparing (3.5) and (3.6), the fully rational manager chooses
delegation if and only if
aM 
p
2aA:
It is straightforward that the fully rational manager prefers to delegate
the critical task as long as his own ability is smaller than the agents ability,
i.e. as long as aM  aA. Moreover, note that there is a range of values
(i.e. aM 2
 
aA;
p
2aA

) for which the manager also delegates the critical
task to the agent, even though his ability is strictly higher than the agents
ability. This is due to the fact that in equilibrium the critical task 1 is
performed with higher levels of e¤ort and, thus, with a higher e¤ort cost,
than the other task. Hence, delegating the task may pay, because delegation
reduces the managers e¤ort cost more than it reduces the expected outcome
of the critical task when it is performed by the agent with the somewhat
lower ability. As the fully rational manager cannot commit to the e¢ cient
43
task allocation this may lead to ine¢ cient job distributions and lower total
welfare in equilibrium. However, once the agents ability falls below the
threshold
p
2
2
aM , the manager prefers to perform the critical task himself,
because the benet from the own higher ability surpasses the higher e¤ort
cost.
3.3.3 Optimal delegation choice of an overcondent
manager
In this section, we examine the task allocation choice of an overcondent man-
ager, assuming that overcondence leads to an overly optimistic perception
of the own abilities. Recall that the self-perceived ability of an overcondent
manager is given by
aOCM = aM + b; with b > 0:
Given this slight modication of the model, we derive the equilibrium
choices of the overcondent manager and the agent and compare these to
the case with a fully rational manager. By substituting aOCM for aM and
following the same procedure applied in the previous section, we derive the
condition under which the overcondent manager chooses delegation:
aM 
p
2aA   b:
By decreasing the right-hand side of the inequality, any positive self-
perception bias b lowers the threshold for non-delegation, reducing the range
of values for which delegation is chosen by the overcondent manager. Hence,
it is obvious that an overcondent manager is more likely to hoard respon-
sibility than a fully rational manager of the same true ability. In particular,
the higher the self-perception bias b, the larger the range of ability values for
which a fully rational manager delegates the critical task, but an overcon-
dent manager will not, i.e. the greater the range of ability values in which
the critical task is carried out by the manager. We summarize our ndings
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 With perfect information on the agents ability parameter
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aA, any positive self-perception bias b > 0 leads to responsibility hoarding by
the overcondent manager. In particular, the range of manager types choos-
ing delegation is strictly decreasing in the managersdegree of overcondence
b.
As we have shown in the last section, fully rational managers cannot com-
mit to the e¢ cient task allocation as they have an incentive to lower their
own e¤ort cost by delegating the critical task to the agent as long as the
agents ability is su¢ ciently high. In contrast, overcondent managers over-
estimate their own ability, and therefore, allocate the critical task more often
to themselves than fully rational managers. In particular, overcondent man-
agers are more likely to hoard responsibility the larger their self-perception
bias is. However, the task allocations chosen by overcondent managers may
be closer to the e¢ cient allocation than those of rational managers. Hence,
overcondence can be considered as a commitment device for managers to
take more responsibilities and increase the e¢ ciency of the job distribution,
positively a¤ecting the total welfare.
3.3.4 Is overcondence benecial or harmful?
As we have shown in the previous section, manager overcondence may lead
to less delegation and can, thus, improve the e¢ ciency of the task allocations.
Since an overcondent manager in general exerts more e¤ort, the total output
of the rm is often higher than with a rational manager. The higher e¤ort
level, however, also leads to a higher cost of e¤ort for the overcondent
manager than for the rational manager. Hence, it is not clear whether the
managers overcondence is generally benecial or harmful with regard to
total welfare. In this section, we show that in many cases, including some
in which the task allocation is not individually optimal for the manager,
overcondence is benecial regarding the total welfare of the involved parties.
Comparing the total welfare in equilibrium with a fully rational manager to
that with an overcondent manager, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the managers self-perception bias b is on a moderate level
relative to his true ability (i.e. b < 2aM) and his true ability is su¢ ciently
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high (i.e. aM >
p
2aA) or su¢ ciently low (i.e. aM <
p
2aA   b), the total
welfare of the involved parties in equilibrium is strictly higher with an over-
condent manager than with a fully rational manager. For any ability value
of the manager between those two thresholds (i.e.
p
2aA   b  aM 
p
2aA),
this result still holds if the managers true ability is at least as high as the
agents true ability (i.e. aM  aA).
Proof. See the appendix.
This result has several interesting implications. First, note that the man-
agers overcondence is not generally harmful and can even be benecial for
the total welfare, if it is not too strong. On the one hand, the overcondent
manager overestimates his own ability, and therefore, exerts more e¤ort than
the fully rational manager, irrespective of the task allocation. On the other
hand, the overcondent manager also expects a higher total outcome when
carrying out the critical task himself, and thus, is more likely to allocate
the critical task to himself than his fully rational counterpart. This type of
responsibility hoarding behavior, in turn, may lead to higher e¢ ciency of the
job distribution if the manager is more able than the agent. Hence, over-
condence helps to reduce free-riding. Indeed, this positive incentive e¤ect
of manager overcondence can even over-compensate the negative e¤ect of
individually suboptimal task allocation as long as the manager is at least as
productive as the agent. Note that this nding is also in line with our result
from the rst-best case stating that the delegation of the critical task is only
e¢ cient if the agent is more productive than the manager. In particular,
the total welfare in equilibrium with an overcondent manager is closer to
the e¢ cient allocation than with a fully rational manager of the same true
ability. Hence, all involved parties may in fact benet from a moderate level
of manager overcondence.
3.3.5 Optimal degree of manager overcondence
As the managers overcondence can be benecial for the total welfare, it
is straightforward to proceed in our analysis with the determination of its
optimal degree with respect to the total welfare. In this regard, we can show:
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Proposition 4 If the manager is overcondent with a positive self-perception
bias b > 0, the total welfare is highest if the managers self-perception bias
(or degree of overcondence) is equal to his true ability, i.e. b = aM .
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that the positive welfare e¤ect of overcondence is strictly increas-
ing in the managers true ability. Intuitively, the higher the managers true
ability is, the less harmful is his biased self-perception, the more likely re-
sponsibility hoarding may positively a¤ect the total welfare. Moreover, it is
also straightforward to see that the managers e¤ort choice exactly matches
the e¢ cient level, if the degree of his overcondence is equal to his true
ability. We summarize this result in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If a managers degree of overcondence is equal to the true
value of his ability, i.e. b = aM , his e¤ort choice in equilibrium is exactly
equal to the e¢ cient e¤ort level, both in case of delegation and non-delegation.
Proof. The results follows directly by substituting aM for b into the over-
condent managers incentive conditions.
3.4 Persistence of manager overcondence
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that manager overcondence
can lead to less delegation, resulting in more e¢ cient task allocations both in
a perfect information setting. The question that remains to be answered is
whether the managersovercondence and responsibility hoarding behavior
can persist over time, given the feedback that managers receive from their
previous decisions. If managers quickly learn to correct their overcondent
assessment of the own ability, then overcondence and responsibility hoarding
will not persist. However, if the feedback from previous outcomes cannot be
used to correct overcondence, we can establish that responsibility hoarding
can be a persistent phenomenon with a sustained e¤ect on organizational
performance.
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In this section, we derive the conditions under which manager overcon-
dence (and responsibility hoarding) can persist, even though managers re-
ceive feedback on their previous decisions. We restrict our analysis to the case
that the manager only receives feedback on the total output of the rm (or
the organizational unit). Obviously, persistence of manager overcondence
with more exact information, e.g. on all ability and e¤ort parameters, would
not be feasible. In the more realistic situation that we analyze, we assume
that the agents ability parameter is her private information. More specif-
ically, we assume that the manager uses an estimate of the agents ability
parameter denoted by baA. Now, the feedback information is restricted to the
total output, so that the overcondent manager faces one known parameter
(his own e¤ort level), two unknown parameters (the agents ability and ef-
fort level), and one parameter that he believes to know, but actually does not
(his own ability). Under these circumstances, we show that the overcondent
manager may not be able to learn that his self-assessment is biased, because
he can construct a consistent model that explains the observed total outcome
with an overestimated own ability parameter and an underestimated ability
parameter for the agent.4 As long as the productivity of the agent can be
underestimated su¢ ciently, the managers overcondence can persist.
We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If the agents true ability aA is su¢ ciently high, i.e. aA 

(1 )
p
(aMb+ b2), the managers overcondence persists, because the man-
ager rationalizes the observed outcome information by underestimating the
agents ability. The higher the managers self-perception bias b is, the stronger
the underestimation of the agents ability will be.
Proof. See the appendix.
A straightforward corollary to the proposition in this section is concerned
with the limits of persistent overcondence:
4Young (2002) shows that some games cannot be learned by rational players and demon-
strates a class of learning environments in which convergence to equilibrium behavior fails
to occur for any learning process, including the Bayesian updating of objectively correct
priors.
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Corollary 2 Manager overcondence is not persistent at any (positive) level
if aA = 0.
The corollary simply points out that there is always some level of overcon-
dence that is persistent, as long as the agents ability is not zero. Intuitively,
it is clear that overcondence can only persist, as long as the overcondent
manager has the possibility to underestimate the agents contribution to the
observed total output, and thus, the ability of the agent. The range for the
underestimation drops if the agents ability is decreased, leaving less and less
room for persistently overcondent managers. If the agents ability is zero,
she would not contribute at all to the total output and persistent overcon-
dence would no longer be possible. But, note that the extreme case of zero
ability has no empirical relevance, because it describes a situation in which
the agent cannot contribute to the output of the rm. Hence, the corol-
lary shows that for any situation with empirical relevance, there is at least
some level of persistent overcondence, leading to some amount of persistent
responsibility hoarding by overcondent managers.
3.5 Discussion
Using the results of the sections above, we discuss the range of optimal and
persistent manager overcondence and responsibility hoarding constellations
in this section. The constellations are exhibited in Figure 3.1. It shows the
four functions that determine the di¤erent outcome regions in the ability
space. The managers ability is plotted on the horizontal and the agents
(possibly estimated) ability is plotted on the vertical axis.5
The dashed bisecting line depicts the function aA = aM which separates
the area of e¢ cient delegation choices above the line from the area of e¢ cient
non-delegation choices below the line. The solid line running through the
origin depicts the function aA =
p
2
2
aM and separates the area of individually
optimal delegation (i.e. rational delegation) above the line from the area of
individually optimal non-delegation (i.e. rational non-delegation) below the
5We have xed  = 0:55 and b = 4 to make a two-dimensional plot possible.
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line. The area of individually optimal delegation is larger than the area of
individually optimal non-delegation, because - as we have seen in section 3.3
- the rational manager always prefers to avoid the high costs of e¤ort for
performing the critical task, as long as the agents ability is not too low.
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Figure 3.1: Range of optimal and persistent overcondence and
responsibility-hoarding constellations depending on managers and agents
abilities
The solid line that intersects the vertical axis above the origin depicts the
function baA = p22 (aM + b) and separates the area of delegation (the dotted
area above the line) from the area of non-delegation (below the line) chosen
by an overcondent manager.6 Note that in the dotted area both the fully
rational and the overcondent manager choose to delegate the critical task to
the agent, while below the line running through the origin (the dashed area),
6baA denotes the estimated value of the agents ability used by the manager.
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both the fully rational and the overcondent manager choose to carry out
the critical task themselves. The area enclosed by the functions aA =
p
2
2
aM
and baA = p22 (aM + b) contains all ability constellations for responsibility
hoarding, in which the overcondent manager still assigns the critical task
to himself, but the rational manager does not.
The function aA = (1 )
p
(aMb+ b2) separates the area of persistent
(above) from the area of non-persistent manager overcondence (below).
Note that this separation is only valid in the area where responsibility hoard-
ing occurs, i.e. the area enclosed by the functions aA =
p
2
2
aM and baA =p
2
2
(aM + b). Our graph shows a large area of non-persistent (the shaded
area and the dark grey area) and a relatively small area of persistent man-
ager overcondence with responsibility hoarding by the overcondent man-
ager (the white area and the white-dotted area). Intuitively, it seems clear
that manager overcondence has a lower chance to persist, if the manager
carries out the critical task himself. The reason is that the overcondent man-
ager always has more room to rationalize his overly optimistic self-perception
by underestimating the agents contribution when the critical task that has
greater impact on the total outcome is carried out by the agent.
The di¤erence between the tasks concerning their impact on the rm
outcome, i.e. the value of the parameter , in fact, a¤ects the location of
the persistency curve (the function aA = (1 )
p
(aMb+ b2)) and, thus, the
size of persistent overcondence areas in the graph (the white area and the
white-dotted area). The more important the critical task is when compared
to the other task (i.e. the higher ), the smaller are the areas of persistent
overcondence and responsibility hoarding. The more asymmetric a task
constellation is, the more di¢ cult it is for the overcondent manager to nd
a feasible set of parameters, in which the overestimation of the own ability
can be compensated by underestimating the ability of the agent.
A similar but more subtle e¤ect exists concerning the self-perception bias
b. As b increases, the area of responsibility hoarding obviously also increases.
Note, however, that an increase in the level of overcondence b also means
that the persistency curve shifts upwards, reducing the area of persistent
responsibility hoarding. Hence, more overcondent managers will tend to
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carry out the critical task more frequently, but are also more likely to re-
ceive feedback that lets them revise their self-assessment and reduce their
overcondence.
Another implication of our analysis is that both the managers and the
agents abilities must be relatively high to enable a persistent manager over-
condence. This is because the agents ability must be high enough to allow
for the relatively high degree of underestimation that persistency of over-
condence requires. Since persistent overcondence of the manager is more
likely to occur, when the ability levels of the two players are rather close to
each other, responsibility hoarding is most likely to be observed, when the
overcondent managers true ability is close the ability level of a high ability
agent.
Finally, there are constellations of ability parameters for which manager
overcondence and responsibility hoarding have a sustained e¤ect on the total
welfare of all involved parties (the white area and the white-dotted area).
However, persistent manager overcondence and responsibility hoarding are
welfare increasing only if the manager is indeed more able than the agent
(the white-dotted area). This nding is in line with our results of the rst-
best case that the critical task should always be carried out by the more able
individual due to its higher impact on total outcome.
3.6 Conclusions and managerial implications
We studied the consequences of manager overcondence for organizational
performance in a setting in which the manager chooses the allocation of
tasks. We have proved that an overcondent manager may exhibit respon-
sibility hoarding behavior, i.e. assign the critical task more often to himself
than a rational manager would do. We have shown that while responsibil-
ity hoarding generally decreases the managers individual utility, it tends
to increase the rm output and the total welfare of the involved parties,
when compared to the case of a fully rational manager. The reason for this
seemingly counter-intuitive result is that overcondent managers generally
exert higher levels of e¤ort than rational managers, due to their overestima-
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tion of the own productivity. In this regard, overcondence counterbalances
shirking, causing managers to take up more responsibility and to reduce the
ine¢ ciency of e¤ort minimizing task allocation.
Hence, our results imply that rms will not generally avoid overcondent
and responsibility hoarding managers, but may even prefer them to fully ra-
tional managers. In a situation where the rm cannot establish a contract to
enforce the e¢ cient allocation of tasks, moderate overcondence of a manager
can mitigate the negative e¤ects of free-riding. Then, the rm may prefer to
hire a moderately overcondent manager to avoid the contract problem. In
connection with the well-established evidence that men are generally more
overcondent than women (see e.g. Barber and Odean (2001), Correll (2001),
Bengtsson et al. (2005)), our result may also provide a further possible ex-
planation why leadership positions are more often occupied by men than by
women.7
Moreover, we have shown that an overcondent managers biased self-
perception and his responsibility hoarding behavior can persist, as long as the
manager can rationalize observed outcomes, by underestimating the ability
of the agent. Notably, the probability of persistent overcondence does not
only depend on the level of overcondence, but also on the absolute level of
the playerstrue abilities. The higher the ability levels in a workplace, the
more likely it is to observe persistent overcondence. This is due to the fact
that high-ability agents can be underestimated to a higher extent than low-
ability agents. The more an agents ability can be underestimated, the easier
it is for an overcondent manager to rationalize the observed output without
having to adapt the overestimation of his own ability. Hence, responsibility
hoarding is more likely to be widespread and persistent in workplaces with
high ability workers and low accountability of work output than in settings
with low ability workers or with a high traceability of exerted work e¤ort.
Responsibility hoarding is also more likely to persist in situations, in
which the asymmetry between tasks is relatively low. The more similar tasks
are in their impact on total output, the easier it is for the overcondent
manager to rationalize the observed total output by underestimating the
7For this point see also Palomino and Peyrache (2010).
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contribution of the agent. If, in contrast, the task that the agent performs
has very little impact on total output, the overcondent manager will nd
it di¢ cult to rationalize observed low output levels without having to adapt
the biased assessment of his own ability.
Note that if there is persistent responsibility hoarding at a workplace,
the agents work satisfaction will most probably decrease over time, due to
the continued underestimation of her true ability. Hence, while the biased
perception of the overcondent manager motivates him to exert more e¤ort
than a rational manager would, it may also cause lower satisfaction levels
amongst the agents, leading to more tensions at the workplace and higher
turnover rates. Interestingly, a high turnover rate amongst agents may even
further support the persistence of the managers overcondence, because a
constant input of new agents tends to reduce the power of the statistical
evidence that would be needed for the overcondent manager to discover his
self-perception bias.
Finally, our analysis also implies that allowing employees to choose their
tasks may lead to lower degrees of free-riding than predicted, if the employ-
ees exhibit some degrees of overcondence. Especially when the cost of a
centrally planned task allocation is high, allowing overcondent employees
to volunteer for high-e¤ort tasks may be a cost e¢ cient second-best solution.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we consider the case if aM >
p
2aA. In this case, both a fully rational
manager and an overcondent manager will choose non-delegation. This is
also the individually optimal task allocation for the manager. The total
welfare with a fully rational manager is equal to the sum of the utilities of
manager and agent which is given by
W nd = UndM + U
nd
A (3.7)
=
 
aMe
nd
M + (1  ) aAendA
  c
2
end2M  
c
2
end2A
=
32a2M
8c
+
3 (1  )2 a2A
8c
:
With an overcondent manager it is equal to
WOCnd = UOCndM + U
OCnd
A (3.8)
=
 
aMe
OCnd
M + (1  ) aAeOCndA
  c
2
eOCnd2M  
c
2
eOCnd2A
=
32a2M
8c
+
3 (1  )2 a2A
8c
+
2 (2aM   b) b
8c
:
Comparing (3.7) and (3.8), it follows directly that the total welfare with
an overcondent manager is strictly higher than with a fully rational manager
if b < 2aM :
Second, we consider the case if aM <
p
2aA  b: In this case, both a fully
rational manager and an overcondent manager will choose delegation, which
is also the individually optimal task allocation for the manager. The total
welfare with a fully rational manager is given by
W d = UdM + U
d
A (3.9)
=
 
(1  ) aMedM + aAedA
  c
2
ed2M  
c
2
ed2A
=
3 (1  )2 a2M
8c
+
32a2A
8c
:
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With an overcondent manager total welfare is
WOCd = UOCdM + U
OCd
A (3.10)
=
 
(1  ) aMeOCdM + aAeOCdA
  c
2
eOCd2M  
c
2
eOCd2A
=
3 (1  )2 a2M
8c
+
32a2A
8c
+
(1  )2 (2aM   b) b
8c
:
Again by comparing (3.9) and (3.10), the total welfare with an overcon-
dent manager is strictly higher than with a fully rational manager if b < 2aM :
Finally, we consider the non-trivial case, in which aM 
p
2aA  aM + b.
In this case, a fully rational manager chooses to delegate the critical task
to the agent, while an overcondent manager carries out the critical task
himself.
Comparing (3.8) and (3.9), the total welfare is higher with an overcon-
dent manager if
(2  1) (aM + aA) (aM   aA) + 
2
3
(2aM   b) b  0:
Note that as long as the managers ability is at least as high as the agents,
i.e. aM  aA, and the managers degree of overcondence is on a moderate
level, i.e. b < 2aM , the total welfare with an overcondent manager is higher
than with a fully rational manager.
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we consider the case aM >
p
2aA b, in which an overcondent manager
chooses not to delegate the critical task. In this case, the total welfare is given
by
UOCnd =
32a2M
8c
+
3 (1  )2 a2A
8c
+
2 (2aM   b) b
8c
:
By solving the following optimization problem
max
b
UOCnd
s:t: b >
p
2aA   aM
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we obtain
@UOCnd
@b

= 0
, 
2
4c
(aM   b) = 0
, b = aM :
Note that the second-order condition is automatically satised as UOCnd
is strictly concave in b. Furthermore, the constraint b >
p
2aA   aM is also
satised as long as aM >
p
2
2
aA: Hence,
b = aM if aM >
p
2
2
aA
Second, we consider the case aM 
p
2aA   b, in which an overcondent
manager chooses to delegate the critical task. In this case, the total welfare
is given by
UOCd =
3 (1  )2 a2M
8c
+
32a2A
8c
+
(1  )2 (2aM   b) b
8c
:
Again, by solving the following optimization problem
max
b
UOCd
s:t: b 
p
2aA   aM
we obtain
@UOCd
@b

= 0
, (1  )
2
4c
(aM   b) = 0
, b = aM :
Note that the second-order condition is automatically satised as UOCd
is strictly concave in b. Furthermore the constraint b  p2aA   aM is also
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satised as long as aM 
p
2
2
aA: Hence,
b = aM if aM 
p
2
2
aA
and the optimal degree of overcondence is given b = aM .
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We prove the results by rst analyzing the case of non-delegation and then the
case of delegation. We derive the two conditions for sustained overcondence.
We then show that as long as the critical task contributes more to the total
output than the other task, i.e. as long as 1
2
<  < 1, the condition stated in
the proposition is binding for both delegation and non-delegation situations.
Finally, we show that the higher the managers self-perception bias, the more
the agents ability is underestimated.
1. Persistence of overcondence in the case of non-delegation
Our essential assumption is that the manager will not revise his assess-
ment of the own ability as long as he observes outcomes that can be ratio-
nalized by varying the two unknown parameters, i.e. the agents ability and
e¤ort level. As long as any observed outcome can be rationalized by the man-
ager, overcondence is persistent. In the following, we derive the su¢ cient
condition for the persistence of overcondence in case of non-delegation.
Recall that the total output in case of non-delegation is given by
Y OCnd = aMeOCndM + (1  ) aAeOCndA :
If an overcondent manager observes this total output, he overestimates
his own contribution and underestimates the agents contribution as follows:
Y OCndP =  (aM + b) e
OCnd
M + (1  )baAbeOCndA
where baA denotes the estimated value of the agents ability and beA the cor-
responding estimated value of the agents e¤ort used by the manager.
This biased model (i.e. the overcondent rationalization of the observed
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output) is only feasible as long as the following condition holds:
Y OCnd   (aM + b) eOCndM
, aMeOCndM + (1  ) aAeOCndA   (aM + b) eOCndM
, aA  
(1  )
p
(aMb+ b2):
Next, we check for the degree of underestimation of the agents contribu-
tion in case of non-delegation. Let   aA   baA denote the underestimation
of the agents ability. Since Y OCnd = Y OCndP we can determine the level of
underestimation by solving the following equation:
Y OCnd = Y OCndP
, aMeOCndM + (1  ) aAeOCndA =  (aM + b) eOCndM + (1  )baAbeOCndA
, aA   baA = 2
(1  )2
aMb+ b
2
(aA + baA)
,  = 
2
(1  )2
aMb+ b
2
(aA + baA) > 0:
Since  is greater than zero, we have established a positive underestima-
tion of the agents ability that increases in the managers self-perception bias
b.
2. Persistence of overcondence in the case of delegation
Now, we derive the su¢ cient condition for the persistence of overcon-
dence in case the manager delegates the critical task to the agent. Recall
that the total output in the case of delegation is
Y OCd = (1  ) aMeOCdM + aAeOCdA :
The overcondent manager rationalizes the observation of this output as
follows
Y OCdP = (1  ) (aM + b) eOCdM + baAbeOCdA :
The overestimation of the own contribution (underestimation of the agents
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ability) is only feasible as long as the following condition holds:
Y OCd  (1  ) (aM + b) eOCdM
, (1  ) aMeOCdM + aAeOCdA  (1  ) (aM + b) eOCdM
, aA  (1  )

p
(aMb+ b2):
Analogous to the non-delegation case, we check for the degree of under-
estimation of the agents contribution in case of delegation. Let   aA baA
denote the underestimation of the agents ability. Since Y d = Y dP we can
determine the level of underestimation by solving the following equation:
Y OCd = Y OCdP
, (1  ) aMeOCdM + aAeOCdA = (1  ) (aM + b) eOCdM + baAbeOCdA
,  = (1  )
2
2
aMb+ b
2
(aA + baA) > 0:
Again, we nd that  is greater than zero, i.e. the overcondent manager
underestimates the agents ability and the underestimation increases in the
managers self-perception bias b.
3. General conditions for both cases
Taking the results of the two parts together, we can show that for all
cases in which the critical task contributes more to the total output than the
other task, i.e. as long as 1
2
<  < 1, the condition for persistence in the
second case (delegation) is generally more restrictive than in the rst case:

1   >
1  

; for any  2

1
2
; 1

:
Hence, if aA  (1 )
p
(aMb+ b2) is true, then the condition aA  (1 )
p
(aMb+ b2)
also holds, allowing us to use the former as a general condition in the
proposition.
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Chapter 4
Overcondence, Helping E¤ort,
and Team Performance1
4.1 Introduction
Overcondence is one of the most well-studied cognitive biases in psychology
and behavioral economics. It describes a behavioral pattern that involves
the overestimation of the own capabilities, especially in tasks with a partially
stochastic outcome (see e.g. Soll (1996)). The nature of this phenomenon is,
on the one hand, that people usually tend to overestimate the reliability of
their knowledge (see e.g. Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Russo and Schoemaker
(1992)). On the other hand, people also tend to overestimate their own
abilities. In this regard, a famous nding was reported by Svenson (1981)
that most car drivers believe that they are safer and more skillful than the
average driver.2
While the behavioral pattern of overcondence and its e¤ects on nancial
decision-making have been extensively studied, the e¤ects of overcondence
on organizational performance are not fully understood yet. Most of the ex-
isting literature on overcondence in managerial settings is focused on the ex-
cessive market entry or exaggerated investment risks taken by overcondent
1This chapter is based upon Zhou (2011).
2For a comprehensive overview of the psychological literature on overcondence see e.g.
Weinberg (2009).
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managers (see e.g. Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2005),
Malmendier and Tate (2008), Hackbarth (2008)). In contrast, Palomino and
Sadrieh (2011) show that overcondence doesnt have to be harmful at all as
overcondent portfolio managers may exhibit risk attitudes that are more in
line with the investorsrisk attitudes compared to fully rational risk-averse
managers. Analyzing Data of large publicly traded rms from 1980 to 1994,
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) nd a robust positive association between CEOs
overcondence and their rmsinnovative performance. The reason is that
overcondent CEOs underestimate the probability of failure, and thus, are
more likely to pursue innovation.
In this chapter, we investigate how agentsoverly optimistic self-perception
a¤ects the incentives for helping and team performance. For this purpose, we
introduce a model in which a manager and an agent can both exert e¤ort into
a joint production. Furthermore, the manager also can assist the agent by
providing helping e¤ort to his task.3 We show that overcondent agents gen-
erally tend to exert higher e¤ort to the team production than fully rational
agents would, even though it is individually suboptimal as they su¤er from
higher e¤ort costs. Surprisingly, this individually suboptimal behavior is not
generally harmful for the agentsutility, and in contrast, can even be advan-
tageous for all involved parties, as long as the agentsbiased self-perception is
not too strong. However, the positive e¤ect of agent overcondence crucially
depends on the information setting, i.e. whether the managers are aware
of the agentsoverly optimistic self-assessment. If managers anticipate the
agentsbiased self-perception, and hence, expect higher e¤ort levels of the
agents, they will extend their helping e¤ort respectively, leading to higher
team outcome. As a result, both individual utility and total welfare of all in-
volved parties will be higher. Intuitively, this e¤ect results from the fact that
overcondent agents overestimate their own productivity and exert higher
e¤ort than fully rational agents, due to their higher self-perceived marginal
return of e¤ort. This positive incentive e¤ect of overcondence is further
3In this chapter, we use the female pronoun for the manager and the male pronoun for
the agent, because males are generally found to exhibit a higher degree of overcondence
than females (see e.g. Barber and Odean (2001), Correll (2001), Bengtsson et al. (2005)).
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enhanced by higher levels of helping e¤ort provided by managers due to the
complementary production technology. However, if managers are not aware
of agentsovercondence, the latter e¤ect doesnt occur.
Moreover, we also consider the persistence of agent overcondence and
show that it is sustainable, as long as the agent can rationalize his overly
optimistic self-perception by underestimating the ability of the manager. The
more leeway an overcondent agent has to rationalize the observed outcome
without having to adapt his positively biased assessment of the own ability
level, the more likely it is to observe persistent individually suboptimal but
welfare improving contribution behavior and higher level of cooperation in an
organization. However, the persistence of agent overcondence also crucially
depends on the information setting. In particular, agent overcondence is
more likely to persist if the manager is aware of the agents biased self-
perception.
In the recent years, there is a growing number of papers studying the
e¤ect of biased self-perception on rm performance. In a principal-agent
context, Santos-Pinto (2008) investigates the e¤ects of workersmistaken be-
liefs about their abilities and shows that rms may have incentives to hire
workers with mistaken beliefs when e¤ort is observable. In particular, rms
can take advantage from workersmistaken beliefs about their coworkers
abilities by using interdependent incentive schemes instead of individualistic
ones. In another theoretical framework, Santos-Pinto (2010) studies the e¤ect
of positive self-image on workersproductivity in rms where incentives are
provided through tournaments and comes up to the conclusion that rms are
usually better o¤ if they hire workers which overestimate themselves in tour-
naments. Moreover, he also shows that a moderate level of overestimation
by the workers can lead to higher welfare in the tournament. Similar results
are also derived by Nieken et al. (2011) who show that a moderate level of
manager overcondence may lead to more e¢ cient task allocations and im-
prove rm performance as overcondent managers underestimate their e¤ort
costs, and hence, take up more responsibilities than fully rational managers
would.
In a team production setting with complementary production technology,
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Gervais and Goldstein (2007) show that biased self-perception is not generally
harmful for the team performance. Moreover, the presence of overcondent
agents can even improve the coordination amongst the team members and
helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Similar results are derived by Lud-
wig et al. (2011a) who also show that overcondent agents are better o¤ if
they are not aware of other team membersbiased self-perception. While our
results also indicate the positive e¤ect of agent overcondence on team per-
formance, we show that, in contrast, all involved parties may be better o¤ if
managers are perfectly informed on their subordinatesbiased self-perception.
Regarding the incentives for cooperation and helping each other, a well-
known result implies that incentive schemes purely based on individual per-
formance may reduce the individualswillingness to help each other as help-
ing is usually costly and hinders them from working on their own tasks (see
e.g. Drago and Turnbull (1988), Lazear (1989), Drago and Garvey (1998),
Encinosa et al. (2007), Burks et al. (2009)). By considering a multi-tasking
environment where agents can allocate their e¤orts to various independent
tasks, Itoh (1991) shows that it can be benecial to use reward scheme based
on team performance when mutual support is useful. As agents usually align
their own e¤orts to maximize the expected outcome of the task for which
they are mainly responsible, and therefore, might provide insu¢ cient help-
ing e¤ort to their co-workers.4 This also implies that cooperation and helping
are only meaningful if each agent increases his own e¤ort responding to an
increase in helping from the other agent, and vice versa. In our model, such a
complementarity is imbedded between the agents productive e¤ort and the
managers helping e¤ort.
4See also Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Itoh (1992), Drago and Garvey (1998) and
Dur and Sol (2010). The empirical evidence on the e¤ects of group incentives on helping
on the job is so far rather miscellaneous. Drago and Garvey (1998), for instance, analyze
data from the Australian manufacturing industry and nd that prot sharing appear to
have little positive e¤ect on workershelping e¤orts. Using employee data of the German
Socio-Economic Panel, Heywood et al. (2005) show that prot sharing may lead workers
to increase their coworkersproductivity through greater cooperation which is reected
in better relations among the workers. Berger et al. (2011) use data from an employer-
employee matched survey of German companies and nd a positive link between team-
based compensation schemes and cooperation in teams. In contrast, neither incentives
based on individual nor on rm performance a¤ect cooperation among employees.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The basic model
is described in section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the rst-best e¤ort choices
and the individually optimal e¤ort choices chosen by manager and agent
under di¤erent information settings. Section 4.4 analyzes the e¤ect of agent
overcondence on individual utility and total welfare. Section 4.5 considers
the persistence of agent overcondence. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The model
One manager and one agent (i =M [anager] ; A [gent]) can both exert e¤ort
into a joint production. Both individuals are risk neutral. The total output
is given by
Y = aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM
where ai denotes is true ability, ei her e¤ort exerted to the team production,
and hM the managers helping e¤ort providing to the agent (e.g. support or
mentoring functions).5 All e¤ort choices are chosen simultaneously. Further-
more, we assume that only the total output is observable for both manager
and agent.
The individual e¤ort costs are described by a convex cost functionC (ei) =
1
2
e2i . The managers costs for helping e¤ort (or opportunity costs of helping)
are strictly increasing in the level of helping e¤ort, i.e.  (hM) =
c
2
h2M with
c > 1 indicating that helping e¤ort is more costly than productive e¤ort.
For simplicity, we assume that both manager and agent receive the same
share of
1
2
from the total output. Hence, the managers utility is given by
UM =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
and the agents utility is equal to
UA =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2A:
5In the following, we refer ei as indidivual is productive e¤ort.
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Finally, following Gervais and Goldstein (2007) we characterize an over-
condent agent as someone who has an overly optimistic self-perception, and
therefore, systematically overestimates his own ability, i.e.
aOCA = aA + b
where aOCA denotes the overcondent agents self-perceived ability and the
parameter b > 0 his self-perception bias or his degree of overcondence.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
In the rst step, we assume that the agents true ability is common knowledge.
We start by investigating the rst-best case and proceed to the equilibrium
with a fully rational agent. In the second step, we derive the equilibrium with
an overcondent agent where we di¤erentiate between two possible cases, i.e.
whether the manager is aware of the agents overcondence or not. Compar-
ing those results, we then show that, at rst, the manager generally provides
less helping to the fully rational agent than is e¢ cient. Second, if the agent is
overcondent, and moreover, if the manager is also aware of the agents overly
optimistic self-perception, she always provides more helping e¤ort relative to
the case with an fully rational agent of the same true ability. Furthermore,
we prove that the agents biased self-perception is not generally harmful.
From the individual perspective of the manager, it is always advantageous to
work with an overcondent agent irrespective of whether she is aware of the
agents overcondence. Surprisingly, overcondence is not always harmful for
the agent either, and can even be worthwhile if the manager is perfectly in-
formed on the agents overcondence and the agents self-perception bias is on
a moderate level relative to his true ability. Moreover from the point of view
of a social planner, overcondence may indeed be benecial for the total wel-
fare of all involved parties, as long as the increased total output resulted from
the overcondent agents higher e¤ort (and the managers increased helping
e¤ort when she is aware of the agents overcondence) over-compensates the
agents loss due to individually suboptimal e¤ort choices. Finally, we also
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derive the optimal degree of the agents overcondence that maximizes the
total welfare of all involved parties.
4.3.1 First-best equilibrium
In the rst-best case, the total welfare of all involved parties is to be maxi-
mized:
max
eM ;eA;hM
W = (aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M  
1
2
e2A
which leads to the rst-best e¤ort levels described by6
eFBM = aM
hFBM =
aA
c  1
eFBA =
aAc
c  1
: (4.1)
Note that the managers helping e¤ort is strictly increasing in the agents
true ability as the agents productive e¤ort raises with his ability. Due to
the complementarity between the managers helping e¤ort and the agents
productive e¤ort, the manager is more likely to provide helping e¤ort to a
highly productive agent. Furthermore, it is also straightforward to see that
the higher the cost of helping is, the lower is the managers helping e¤ort.
4.3.2 Second-best equilibriumwith exogenous compen-
sation contracts and fully rational agent
We now derive the individualsoptimal e¤ort choices in the second-best case
with exogenous compensation contracts and a fully rational agent. In di¤er-
ence to the rst-best case, the individuals utility is now to be maximized.
With perfect information on the agents ability the maximization problems
6See the appendix for a detailed formal derivation.
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are given by
max
eM ;hM
UM =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
s:t: eA = argmax
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2A
and
max
eA
UA =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2A
s:t: hm = argmax
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
which leads to the optimal e¤ort choices described by7
eSBM =
aM
2
hSBM =
aA
4c  1
eSBA =
2aAc
4c  1
: (4.2)
Comparing (4.1) and (4.2), it is straightforward to see that both the
individualsproductive e¤ort and the managers helping e¤ort are below the
rst-best levels. The reason is that fully rational individuals cannot commit
on the rst-best e¤ort choices as they always have an incentive to lower their
e¤ort costs by choosing e¤ort levels such that their marginal return of e¤ort
matches their marginal costs of e¤ort. Hence, typical free-rider behavior in
a team production environment can be observed here.
7The derivation of the second-best e¤ort choices follows analogously to the rst-best
case, unless that in the second-best case the utility functions of the individuals are to
maximize.
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4.3.3 Third-best equilibrium with exogenous compen-
sation contracts and overcondent agent
In this section, we derive the individualsoptimal e¤ort choices in an equi-
librium with an overcondent agent.8 As the managers decision on helping
e¤ort is crucially a¤ected by the information on agents overcondence, we
di¤erentiate between two possible cases in the following analysis, i.e. whether
the manager is aware of the agents self-perception bias or not.
Perfect information on agents self-perception bias
First, we consider the case when the manager has perfect information on all
ability and overcondence parameters. Furthermore, the agent is convinced
that his biased self-perception is correct and also shared by the manager.
Hence, the individualsoptimization problems are now given by
max
eM ;hM
UM =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
s:t: eA = argmax
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2A
and
max
eA
UA =
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2A
s:t: hm = argmax
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
8We refer an equilibrium in such a setting as a "third-best" equilibrium.
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which leads to the optimal e¤ort choices described by9
eTBM =
aM
2
hTBM =
aA + b
4c  1
eTBA =
2 (aA + b) c
4c  1
: (4.3)
Obviously, both the agents productive e¤ort and the managers helping
e¤ort are strictly increasing in the agents self-perception bias b, i.e. the more
overcondent the agent is, the higher is his productive e¤ort, and in turn, the
more helping he receives from the manager. Comparing (4.2) and (4.3), it is
also straightforward to see that for any b > 0 an overcondent agents e¤ort
is always higher than the e¤ort chosen by a fully rational agent of the same
true ability. Therefore, due to the complementarity between the managers
helping e¤ort and the agents productive e¤ort, the manager always provides
more helping to the overcondent agent than to the fully rational one.
Without information on agents self-perception bias
Now, we consider the case when the manager still has perfect information
on all ability parameters, but doesnt know that the agent is overcondent.
In contrast to the previous case, the manager believes that the agent is fully
rational while the overcondent agent is still convinced that his overly opti-
mistic self-assessment is correct. In particular, the agent also believes that
his biased self-perception is shared by the manager (see e.g. Squintani (2006)
or Santos-Pinto (2010)). Hence, the individualsoptimization problems are
9With perfect information on ability and overcondence parameters, the equilibrium
e¤ort choices can directly derived by substituting aOCA for aA in (4.2).
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now given by
max
eM ;hM
UM =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
s:t: eA = argmax
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2A
and
max
eA
UA =
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2A
s:t: hm = argmax
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
which leads to the optimal e¤ort choices described by10
eTBM = aM2
ehTBM = aA4c  1
eTBA = 2 (aA + b) c4c  1
: (4.4)
Like in the previous case, the agents productive e¤ort is strictly increas-
ing in his self-perception bias b, i.e. the more overcondent he is, the higher
his e¤ort choice. Furthermore by comparing (4.2) and (4.4), it is also straight-
forward to see that overcondent agents always exert higher e¤ort than fully
rational agents of the same true ability. However, in contrast to the previous
case, the overcondent agent now receives a lower level of helping. The rea-
son is that, now, the manager believes that the agent is fully rational. Hence,
she expects a lower level of productive e¤ort of the agent, and in turn, adapts
the amount of helping e¤ort respectively. We summarize our ndings in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any positive self-perception bias b > 0 an overcondent
agent always exerts higher productive e¤ort than a fully rational agent of the
10See the appendix for a detailed formal derivation.
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same true ability. Furthermore, with perfect information on the agents true
ability ai and his self-perception bias b the manager provides more helping
to the overcondent agent than to the fully rational one. In particular, the
higher the overcondent agents self-perception bias is the more helping he
receives. However, if the manager is not aware of the agents biased self-
perception, both overcondent and fully rational agents receive the same level
of helping.
As we have shown in the last section, fully rational agents cannot commit
on the rst-best e¤ort levels as they have an incentive to lower their e¤ort
costs by choosing lower e¤ort levels than is e¢ cient. In contrast, overcon-
dent agents overestimate their own ability, and therefore, choose a higher
e¤ort level than fully rational agents of the same true ability. As a result, the
e¤ort choices chosen by overcondent agents may be closer to the e¢ cient
level than those of fully rational agents. Furthermore, due to the complemen-
tarity in the production technology the manager also exerts higher helping
e¤ort when she is aware of the agents overcondence. Hence, overcondence
can be considered as a commitment device for all individuals to exert higher
e¤orts reducing free-riding, and thus, positively a¤ects the total welfare of
all involved parties. However, the positive output e¤ect of agent overcon-
dence crucially depends on the managers awareness of the agents biased
self-perception. Otherwise, the manager would not adapt her helping e¤ort,
and correspondingly, the higher total output only results from the agents
higher productive e¤ort.
4.4 Is overcondence benecial or harmful?
As we have shown above, overcondence can lead to higher productive e¤ort
and increase the agents contribution to the total output. Moreover, due
to the complementarity of productive and helping e¤orts the manager also
provides more helping to the overcondent agent when she is aware of the
agents biased self-perception. As a result, the total output is higher with
an overcondent agent than with a fully rational agent. As both manager
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and agent benet to the same extent from the total output, their utilities
may also be higher. However, as the overcondent agent also su¤ers from
higher e¤ort costs causing by higher productive e¤ort, it is not clear whether
the agents overcondence is generally benecial or harmful with regard to
the individual utilities and the total welfare of all involved parties. In this
section, we conjecture and prove that in many cases, a moderate level of
agent overcondence is benecial for all involved parties both individually
and with respect to the total welfare, despite of the overcondent agents
individually suboptimal e¤ort choice.
4.4.1 E¤ects of agent overcondence on individual util-
ity
We start our utility analysis by considering the managers individual utility.
By comparing the di¤erent values of the managers utility in equilibrium with
fully rational and overcondent agents we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The manager is always strictly better o¤ when working with
an overcondent agent than with a fully rational agent of the same true abil-
ity. In particular, the managers utility in equilibrium with an overcondent
agent is at highest if she has perfect information on the agents self-perception
bias.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The solid (dotted) line shows the
managers utility in the third-best equilibrium with (without) awareness of
the agents biased self-perception as a correspondence of b; and the dashed
line the managers utility in the second-best equilibrium.11 It is straightfor-
ward to see that the managers utility in equilibrium with an overcondent
agent is strictly increasing in the agents self-perception bias b, and in partic-
ular, always above the utility level in equilibrium with a fully rational agent
of the same true ability. Furthermore, the utility in a third-best equilibrium
is always strictly higher if the manager is perfectly informed on the agents
11The gure shows a setting in which aM = 10; aA = 5; and c = 1:2.
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Figure 4.1: Managers utility in equilibrium depending on b
overcondence parameter. The reason for this result is that the overcondent
agent overestimates his own ability, and hence, increases the total output by
exerting higher e¤ort to the team production. As the manager directly ben-
ets from the higher total output, and furthermore, as the higher e¤ort costs
are exclusively born by the agent, the managers utility increases regard-
less of whether she knows that the agent is overcondent. Moreover, in the
case when the manager is aware of the agents biased self-perception she can
further adapt her helping e¤ort, leading to higher total output.
Now, we proceed the utility analysis by comparing the agents individual
utility in equilibrium depending on whether he is fully rational or overcon-
dent, and in the latter case, whether the manager is aware of his biased
self-perception. The results concerning the agents utility is somewhat mis-
cellaneous. We summarize them in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 With perfect information on ability and overcondence pa-
rameters for the manager, the overcondent agent is always better o¤ than
the fully rational agent of the same true ability if his self-perception bias is on
a moderate level, i.e. b  aA
2c 1 . If the manager is not aware of the agents bi-
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ased self-perception, the overcondent agent is always worse o¤ than the fully
rational agent of the same true ability. Moreover irrespective of his degree of
overcondence, the overcondent agent is always worse o¤ if the manager is
not aware of his overcondence.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Figure 4.2: Agents utility in equilibrium depending on b
Figure 4.2 depicts the agents utility in equilibrium. The solid (dotted)
line shows the agents utility in third-best equilibrium if the manager is
(not) aware of his overcondence parameter as a correspondence of b and
the dashed line the utility of a fully rational agent of the same true ability.12
Note that the overcondent agents utility without the managers awareness
of his biased self-perception is strictly declining in b; and in particular, al-
ways below the utility of the fully rational agent. In contrast, there is a
range of overcondence degrees in which the overcondent agent is strictly
better o¤ than the fully rational agent given the awareness of the manager.
The intuition behind this result is as following: First, note that the overcon-
dent agent always su¤ers from higher e¤ort costs as he overestimates his
12The gure shows a setting in which aM = 10; aA = 5; and c = 1:2.
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marginal return of e¤ort, and therefore, exerts higher e¤ort that is individ-
ually suboptimal irrespective of whether the manager is aware of his biased
self-perception. Second, in case when the manager has perfect information
on ability and overcondence parameters she would increase her helping ef-
fort, leading to higher total output. As the agent benets from higher total
output, his higher e¤ort costs can even be over-compensated. As long as the
agents self-perception bias is not too large, the positive output e¤ect out-
weighs the negative cost e¤ect. Furthermore, note that the upper bound for
the agents self-perception bias aA
2c 1 is strictly increasing in the agents true
ability aA and decreasing in the cost parameter for helping e¤ort c, i.e. the
higher (lower) the agents true ability (the cost for helping) is, the more over-
condent he might be without to be disadvantaged. However, if the manager
is not aware of the agents overcondence, she would not adapt her helping
e¤ort, and hence, the overcondent agent will always be worse o¤ compared
to the fully rational agent of the same true ability.
4.4.2 E¤ects of agent overcondence on total welfare
The previous analysis demonstrates that it is always advantageous for the
manager to work with an overcondent agent. Furthermore, the agent can
also benet from the biased assessment of his own ability as long as his self-
perception bias is not too strong, and moreover, the manager is also perfectly
informed on this self-perception bias. In this section, we conjecture and show
that a moderate level of overcondence can also be benecial with regard to
the total welfare of all involved parties, even when the manager is not aware
of the agents overcondence.
Analogously to the previous section, we compare the values of total wel-
fare in equilibrium with fully rational and overcondent agents taking into
account whether the manager is aware of the agents overcondence. The
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 With perfect information on ability and overcondence pa-
rameters for the manager, the total welfare of all involved parties with an
overcondent agent is higher than with a fully rational agent of the same true
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ability if the overcondent agents self-perception bias is on a moderate level,
i.e. b  8c+2
4c 3aA. However, when the manager is not aware of the agents bi-
ased self-perception the total welfare is still higher if the overcondent agents
degree of overcondence is bounded by b  2aA. Moreover, the total welfare
in equilibrium with an overcondent agent is always higher if the manager
has perfect information on the agents overcondence parameter irrespective
of his degree of overcondence b.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Figure 4.3: Total welfare in equilibrium depending on b
This result is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The solid (dotted) line shows the
total welfare in third-best equilibrium when the manager is (not) aware of
the agents biased self-perception as a correspondence of b and the dashed
line the total welfare in second-best equilibrium with a fully rational agent of
the same true ability. Furthermore, the dot-dashed line depicts the rst-best
level of total welfare.13 In both cases whether the manager is aware of the
agents degree of overcondence, there is a range of self-perception bias in
13The gure shows a setting in which aM = 10; aA = 5; and c = 1:2.
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which the total welfare in the third-best case is above the second-best level,
and thus, closer to the rst-best level. Furthermore, this result also has sev-
eral interesting implications: First, note that the agents overcondence is
not generally harmful and can even be benecial for the total welfare if it
is not too strong. This is due to the fact that the overcondent agent over-
estimates his own ability, and therefore, exerts higher e¤ort than the fully
rational agent of the same true ability, leading to higher total output that
benets all involved parties. With perfect information on overcondence pa-
rameter it also leads to higher helping e¤ort by the manager. Hence, agent
overcondence helps to reduce free-riding. Surprisingly, this positive incen-
tive e¤ect of overcondence can even over-compensate the negative e¤ect of
individually suboptimal e¤ort choice as long as the agents true ability is
su¢ ciently high relative to his self-perception bias. In particular, the total
welfare in equilibrium with an overcondent agent can even be closer to the
rst-best level than with a fully rational agent of the same true ability.
4.4.3 Optimal degree of agent overcondence
As depicted in Figure 4.3, both welfare functions of the third-best cases
have an inverse U-shaped curve. Therefore, we proceed our analysis with
the determination of their local maximum, i.e. the optimal degree of agent
overcondence with respect to the total welfare of all involved parties. In
this regard, we can show:
Proposition 5 With perfect information on ability and overcondence pa-
rameters for the manager, the total welfare of all involved parties is highest if
b = 4c+1
4c 3aA: If the manager is not aware of the agents biased self-perception,
the total welfare takes its maximum if the agents degree of overcondence is
equal to his true ability, i.e. eb = aA:
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that in both cases, the positive welfare e¤ect of agent overcondence
is strictly increasing in the agents true ability which indicates that the higher
the agents true ability is, the less harmful is his biased self-perception. In-
terestingly, the optimal degree of overcondence is equal to the true ability
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of the agent in the latter case such that the equilibrium e¤ort of the over-
condent agent exactly matches its rst-best level.
4.5 Persistence of agent overcondence
In the previous two sections, we have demonstrated that the moderate agent
overcondence can lead to higher e¤ort resulting in higher total welfare for
all involved parties. The question that remains to be answered is whether the
agents overcondence and higher level of contribution and cooperation can
persist over time, given the feedback the agent receives from his previous de-
cisions. If the overcondent agent quickly learns to correct his overcondent
assessment of the own ability, then overcondence and higher contribution
to team output will not persist. However, if the feedback from previous out-
comes cannot be used to correct the biased self-perception, overcondence
can be a persistent phenomenon with a sustained e¤ect on organizational
performance.
In this section, we derive the conditions under which overcondence can
persist, even though the agent receives feedback on his previous decisions.
We restrict our analysis to the case that the agent only receives feedback
on the total output of the rm (or the organizational unit). Obviously, per-
sistence of overcondence with more exact information, e.g. on all ability
and e¤ort parameters, would not be feasible. In the more realistic situation
that we analyze, the feedback information is restricted to observing the to-
tal output, so that the overcondent agent faces one known parameter (his
productive e¤ort), two unknown parameters (the managers ability and pro-
ductive e¤ort), and two parameters that he believes to know, but actually
does not (his true ability and the managers helping e¤ort). Under these cir-
cumstances, we show that the overcondent agent may not be able to learn
that his self-assessment is biased, because he can construct a consistent model
that explains the observed total outcome with an overestimated own ability
parameter and an underestimated ability parameter for the manager.14 As
14Young (2002) shows that some games cannot be learned by rational players and demon-
strates a class of learning environments in which convergence to equilibrium behavior fails
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long as the productivity of the manager can be su¢ ciently underestimated,
the agents overcondence can persist.
We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If aM  4c4c 1
p
(aA + b) b, i.e. the managers true ability is
su¢ ciently high, the agents overcondence persists irrespective of whether
the manager is aware of the agents biased self-perception, because the agent
rationalizes the observed outcome information by underestimating the man-
agers ability. The higher the agents self-perception bias b is, the greater the
underestimation of the managers ability will be.
Proof. 1. Persistence of overcondence when the manager is aware of the
agents biased self-perception
Our essential assumption is that the agent will not revise his biased as-
sessment of the own ability as long as he observes outcomes that can be ra-
tionalized by varying the two unknown parameters, i.e. the managers ability
and productive e¤ort. As long as any observed outcome can be rationalized
by the agent, overcondence is persistent.
First, we derive the su¢ cient condition for the persistence of overcon-
dence when the manager is perfectly informed on the agents overcondence
parameter. Recall that the total output in the case with awareness of the
manager is given by
Y TB = aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM :
However, the overcondent agent who is convinced that his self-perceived
ability is true always overestimates his own contribution to the total output
(aA  eA + eA  hM), and consequently, underestimates the contribution of
the manager. In particular, when the overcondent agent observes this total
output, he rationalizes the composition of the total output as follows:
EA

Y TB

= baM  beTBM + aOCA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM :
to occur for any learning process, including the Bayesian updating of objectively correct
priors.
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where baM and beTBM denote the values of the managers ability and productive
e¤ort estimated by the overcondent agent.
This biased model (i.e. the overcondent rationalization of the observed
output by underestimating the managers contribution) is only feasible as
long as the actual value of the total output is at least as high as the over-
condent agents estimation of his own contribution, i.e. if the following
condition holds:
Y TB  aOCA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
, aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1  aOCA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1
, aM  2
q
(aA+b)bc
4c 1 :
Next, we check for the degree of underestimation of the managers con-
tribution. Let   aM   baM denote the underestimation of the managers
ability. As Y TB = EA

Y TB

we can determine the level of underestimation
by solving the following equation:
Y TB = EA

Y TB

, a2M
2
=
ba2M
2
+ 2(aA+b)bc
4c 1
,  = 4(aA+b)bc
(4c 1)(aM+baM ) > 0:
Since  is always strictly larger than zero, we have established a positive
underestimation of the managers ability that increases in the agents self-
perception bias b, i.e. the larger the agents self-perception bias the greater
the underestimation of the managers ability by the overcondent agent.
2. Persistence of overcondence when the manager is not aware of the
agents biased self-perception
Now, we derive the su¢ cient condition for the persistence of overcon-
dence when the manager is not aware of the agents biased self-perception.
Recall that the total output in this case is given by
eY TB = aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  ehTBM :
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Like in the previous case, the overcondent agent rationalizes the obser-
vation of this output as follows:
EA

Y TB

= baM  beTBM + aOCA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
where baM and beTBM denote the values of the managers ability and productive
e¤ort estimated by the overcondent agent. Note that the level of helping
e¤ort expected by the agent is given by bhTBM = hTBM as the overcondent agent
is convinced of his biased self-perception, and moreover, also assumes that
his self-perception is shared by the manager.
However, the overestimation of the own contribution by underestimating
the managers ability is only feasible as long as the following condition holds:
eY TB  aOCA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
, aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1  aA4c 1  aOCA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1
, aM  4c4c 1
p
(aA + b) b:
Analogously to the case with awareness of the manager, we check for the
degree of underestimation of the managers ability. Let   aM  baM denote
the underestimation of the managers ability. As eY TB = EA Y TB we can
determine the level of underestimation by solving the following equation:
eY TB = EA Y TB
, a2M
2
=
ba2M
2
+ 8(aA+b)bc
2
(4c 1)2
,  = 16(aA+b)bc2
(4c 1)2(aM+baM ) > 0:
Again, we nd that  is strictly larger than zero, i.e. the overcondent
agent always underestimates the managers ability. In particular, the under-
estimation increases in the agents self-perception bias b.
3. General conditions for both cases
Taking the results of the two parts together, we can show that for any
positive self-perception bias b > 0, the condition for persistence in the second
case (without awareness of the agents biased self-perception) is generally
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more restrictive than in the rst case as
4c
4c 1
p
(aA + b) b > 2
q
(aA+b)bc
4c 1 :
Hence, if aM  4c4c 1
p
(aA + b) b is true, then the condition aM  2
q
(aA+b)bc
4c 1
also holds, allowing us to use the former as a general condition in the
proposition.
There are two corollaries following directly from the proposition above:
Corollary 1 No (positive) level of agent overcondence is persistent if aM =
0.
Corollary 2 Agent overcondence is more likely to persist if the manager is
aware of the overcondent agents self-perception bias.
Corollary 1 simply points out that there is always some level of overcon-
dence that is persistent, unless the managers ability is zero. Intuitively,
it is clear that overcondence can only persist, as long as the agent has the
possibility to justify his overestimated own ability by underestimating the
ability of the manager. The range of possible underestimation drops if the
managers ability decreases, leaving less and less room for the overcondent
agent. If the managers ability is zero, persistent overcondence is no longer
feasible. However, note that the extreme case of zero ability has no empirical
relevance, because it describes a situation in which the manager cannot con-
tribute anything to the rms output by own productive e¤ort. Hence, the
corollary implies that for any situation with empirical relevance, there is at
least some level of persistent overcondence, leading to higher contribution of
overcondent agents. Corollary 2 indicates the fact that persistent overcon-
dence is more likely to be observed, if the manager also knows that the agent
is overcondent. When the manager anticipates the agents higher e¤ort as
a consequence of his biased self-perception, she can adapt her helping e¤ort,
respectively. This leads to higher total output which, in turn, allows more
room for the overcondent agent to underestimate the managers contribu-
tion. Hence, the persistence of agent overcondence also crucially depends
on the information setting.
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4.6 Conclusion
We analyzed the e¤ects of agentsovercondence on organizational perfor-
mance. We have shown that overcondent agents usually overestimate their
abilities, and therefore, exert higher e¤ort to the team production and in-
crease the total output, even though their e¤ort choices are not individually
optimal. Although overcondence may negatively a¤ect the agentsindivid-
ual utility, moderately overcondent agents generally tend to increase the
rms output and the total welfare of all involved parties above the level
that fully rational agents would achieve. This seemingly counter-intuitive
nding results, on the one hand, from higher level of e¤ort exerted by over-
condent agents, and on the other hand, also from higher level of helping
e¤ort chosen by managers due to the complementarity of agentsproductive
e¤ort and managershelping e¤ort. However, the e¤ect of overcondence
on individualsutility and total welfare crucially depends on the information
setting, i.e. whether managers are aware of the agentsbiased self-perception.
When managers know that the agents are overcondent, they can adapt the
level of their helping e¤ort, and thus, increase the total output. In this
regard, agent overcondence can be considered as a commitment device re-
ducing free-riding and increasing the managersincentives to provide more
supervising or monitoring functions, leading to a higher level of cooperation
in teams. If managers are not aware of the agents biased self-perception,
the positive output e¤ect only results from the overcondent agentshigher
productive e¤ort. Hence, our results imply that rms should not generally
avoid hiring overcondent agents. In contrast, the employment of overcon-
dent agents may even be advantageous for the rms performance and prot.
However, to fully exploit the advantages from the employment of overcon-
dent agents, managers should have well-founded knowledge on agentsbiased
self-perception.
Furthermore, we have shown that agent overcondence can survive in an
organization, as long as the overcondent agents can rationalize their overly
optimistic estimation of the own ability by underestimating the ability of
the managers. Interestingly, the persistence of overcondence does not only
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depend on the agentsdegree of overcondence, but also on the absolute level
of the managerstrue abilities. In particular, the higher the ability levels in
a workplace, the more likely it is to observe persistent agent overcondence.
This is due to the fact that high-ability managers can be underestimated to
a greater extent than low-ability managers. The more a managers ability
can be underestimated, the easier it is for an overcondent agent to rational-
ize the observed output without having to adapt the overestimation of his
own ability. Moreover, agent overcondence has a greater chance to survive
when managers are aware of the agentsbiased self-perception. The reason
is that managers may prefer to work with overcondent agents because of
their higher contribution to the team production. For this reason, managers
may have an interest to sustain agent overcondence by exerting higher level
of helping e¤ort. Consequently, the total outcome is higher which, in turn,
provides the overcondent agents more room to rationalize their biased self-
assessment resulting in higher probability for persistent agent overcondence.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Derivation of the rst-best e¤ort choices
In the rst-best case the total welfare of all involved parties should be max-
imized:
max
eM ;eA;hM
W = (aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M  
1
2
e2A:
The rst order conditions are given by
@W
@eM
:
= 0, aM   eM = 0, eM = aM (4.5)
@W
@hM
:
= 0, eA   chM = 0, hM = eA
c
(4.6)
@W
@eA
:
= 0, aA + hM   eA = 0, eA = aA + hM (4.7)
The rst-best e¤ort follows directly by inserting (4.6) into (4.7) and some
algebraic transformation.
4.7.2 Derivation of the third-best e¤ort choices with-
out information on the agents overcondence
parameter
Now, the manager believes that the agent is fully rational while the overcon-
dent agent is still convinced of his overly optimistic self-perception. More-
over, the agent is convinced that his self-perception is shared by the manager.
Hence, the individualsoptimization problems are now given by
max
eM ;hM
UM =
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M
s:t: eA = argmax
1
2
(aM  eM + aA  eA + eA  hM)  1
2
e2A
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and
max
eA
UA =
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2A
s:t: hm = argmax
1
2
 
aM  eM + aOCA  eA + eA  hM
  1
2
e2M  
c
2
h2M :
Let U ji denotes the maximization problem of individual i (=M;A) that is
expected by individual j (=M;A) : The rst order conditions are now given
by
@UMM
@eM
:
= 0, 1
2
aM   eM = 0, eM = 1
2
aM (4.8)
@UMM
@hM
:
= 0, 1
2
eA   chM = 0, hM = eA
2c
(4.9)
@UAM
@hM
:
= 0, 1
2
eA   chM = 0, hM = eA
2c
(4.10)
@UMA
@eA
:
= 0, 1
2
(aA + hM)  eA = 0, eA = 1
2
(aA + hM) (4.11)
@UAA
@eA
:
= 0, 1
2
 
aOCA + hM
  eA = 0, eA = 1
2
 
aOCA + hM

(4.12)
The e¤ort levels described by (4.4) can be derived by inserting (4.9) into
(4.11) and (4.10) into (4.12) and some algebraic transformation, respectively.
4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The managers utility in equilibrium with a fully rational agent is given by
USBM =
1
2
 
aM  eSBM + aA  eSBA + eSBA  hSBM
  1
2
eSB2M   c2hSB2M
= 1
2
 
aM  aM2 + aA  2aAc4c 1 + 2aAc4c 1  aA4c 1
  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2
 
aA
4c 1
2
=
a2M
8
+
(8c 1)a2Ac
2(4c 1)2 :
With an overcondent agent, and further, given that the manager is also
aware of the agents self-perception bias b; her utility in equilibrium is de-
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scribed by
UTBM =
1
2
 
aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
  1
2
eTB2M   c2hTB2M
= 1
2

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1

  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2

aOCA
4c 1
2
=
a2M
8
+ (8aAc aA+b)(aA+b)c
2(4c 1)2 :
Finally, with an overcondent agent, and given that the manager is not
aware of the agents self-perception bias, her utility in equilibrium is equal
to
eUTBM = 12 aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  ehTBM   12eTB2M   c2ehTB2M
= 1
2

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1  aA4c 1

  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2
 
aA
4c 1
2
=
a2M
8
+ (8aAc aA+8bc)aAc
2(4c 1)2 :
It is straightforward to see that UTBM > U
SB
M and eUTBM > USBM for any
strictly positive self-perception bias b. Hence, the manager is always better
o¤ with an overcondent agent irrespective of whether she is aware of the
agents overcondence.
Finally, it is easy to show that the managers utility in equilibrium with
an overcondent agent is always strictly higher if she is aware of the agents
self-perception bias as
UTBM   eUTBM = b2c2(4c 1)2 > 0:
4.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The fully rational agents utility in equilibrium is given by
USBA =
1
2
 
aM  eSBM + aA  eSBA + eSBA  hSBM
  1
2
eSB2A
= 1
2
 
aM  aM2 + aA  2aAc4c 1 + 2aAc4c 1  aA4c 1
  1
2
 
2aAc
4c 1
2
=
a2M
4
+
2a2Ac
2
(4c 1)2 :
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With perfect information on ability and overcondence parameters for
the manager, the overcondent agents utility in equilibrium is described by
UTBA =
1
2
 
aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
  1
2
eTB2A
= 1
2

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1

  1
2

2aOCA c
4c 1
2
=
a2M
4
+ (2aAc 2bc+b)
(4c 1)2 (aA + b) c:
Finally, if the manager is not aware of the agents overcondence, the
overcondent agents utility in equilibrium is equal to
eUTBA = 12 aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  ehTBM   12eTB2A
= 1
2

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1  aA4c 1

  1
2

2aOCA c
4c 1
2
=
a2M
4
+ (2aAc 2bc)
(4c 1)2 (aA + b) c:
By comparing USBA and U
TB
A , the rst part of the proposition can be
proved:
UTBA  USBA
, b  aA
2c 1 :
By comparing USBA and eUTBA , the second part of the proposition can be
shown:
USBA > eUTBA
, a2A > (aA   b) (aA + b)
, b2 > 0:
Finally, the last part of the proposition can be shown by comparing UTBA
and eUTBA :
UTBA  eUTBA
, b
(4c 1)2 (aA + b) c  0:
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4.7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The total welfare in equilibrium with a fully rational agent is given by
W SB =
 
aM  eSBM + aA  eSBA + eSBA  hSBM
  1
2
eSB2M   c2hSB2M   12eSB2A
=
 
aM  aM2 + aA  2aAc4c 1 + 2aAc4c 1  aA4c 1
  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2
 
aA
4c 1
2   1
2
 
2aAc
4c 1
2
=
3a2M
8
+
(12c 1)a2Ac
2(4c 1)2 :
With perfect information on ability and overcondence parameters for
the manager, the total welfare in equilibrium with an overcondent agent is
equal to
W TB =
 
aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  hTBM
  1
2
eTB2M   c2hTB2M   12eTB2A
=

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1 
aOCA
4c 1

  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2

aOCA
4c 1
2
  1
2

2aOCA c
4c 1
2
=
3a2M
8
+ (4(3aA b)c (aA 3b))(aA+b)c
2(4c 1)2 :
If the manager is not aware of the agents biased self-perception, the total
welfare in equilibrium with an overcondent agent is equal to
fW TB = aM  eTBM + aA  eTBA + eTBA  ehTBM   12eTB2M   c2ehTB2M   12eTB2A
=

aM  aM2 + aA 
2aOCA c
4c 1 +
2aOCA c
4c 1  aA4c 1

  1
2
a2M
4
  c
2
 
aA
4c 1
2   1
2

2aOCA c
4c 1
2
=
3a2M
8
+
(4(3aA b)(aA+b)c a2A)c
2(4c 1)2 :
By comparing W SB and W TB, the rst part of the proposition can be
proved:
W TB  W SB = (8aAc+2aA+3b 4bc)bc
2(4c 1)2
(8aAc+2aA+3b 4bc)bc
2(4c 1)2  0
, b  2(4c+1)
4c 3 aA:
By comparing W SB and fW TB, the second part of the proposition can be
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shown: fW TB  W SB = 2(2aA b)bc2
(4c 1)2
2(2aA b)bc2
(4c 1)2  0
, b  2aA:
Finally, the last part of the proposition can be shown by comparingW TB
and fW TB:
W TB  fW TB = (2aA+3b)bc
2(4c 1)2 > 0:
4.7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
With perfect information on ability and overcondence parameters for the
manager, the total welfare in the third-best equilibrium is given by
W TB =
3a2M
8
+ ((3aA b)4c (aA 3b))(aA+b)c
2(4c 1)2 :
Solving the rst order condition (@W
TB
@b
:
= 0) leads to
b = 4c+1
4c 3aA:
The second order condition is always satised as
@2WTB
@b2
= (3 4c)c
(4c 1)2 < 0:
If the manager is not aware of the agents biased self-perception, the total
welfare is equal to
fW TB = 3a2M
8
+
(4(3aA b)(aA+b)c a2A)c
2(4c 1)2 :
Again, solving the rst order condition (@fWTB
@b
:
= 0) leads to
eb = aA:
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The second order condition is also always satised as
@2fWTB
@b2
=   4c2
(4c 1)2 < 0:
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